Israel tried to lure Iran into war with Fakhrizadeh’s killing – so far it has failed

Iranian forces carry the coffin of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh during his funeral in Tehran (Reuters)

Yossi Melman

Middle East Eye  /  December 7, 2020

Melman: ‘Eventually Mossad, using technological and digital surveillance, as well as agents on the ground, found soft spots in Fakhrizadeh’s security.’

It is likely Netanyahu and Trump agreed to provoke Iran and make problems for Biden. If Tehran does retaliate, it will likely be on a smaller scale.

As time has elapsed since the killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on 27 November, the chances for quick retaliation are fading away.

After the assassination, in an operation east of Tehran attributed to Israel’s Mossad, senior Iranian leaders have used harsh language to promise revenge, not only against Israel but also the United States and Israel’s new allies in the region, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

Among those vowing retribution were President Hassan Rouhani and military confidants of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, including former Defence Minister Ahmad Wahidi.

But the inflammatory rhetoric subsided. Gut feelings made room for cool-headed decisions. The first question to be asked is, why? Why did Israel decide to kill him?

Fakhrizadeh was a gifted nuclear physicist, who taught and researched at Imam Hossein University in his nation’s capital city. But he was also a brigadier-general in the Revolutionary Guard and deputy defence minister.

For years, Israeli, American, British and German intelligence services have said that his academic credentials were just a front for his real work as head of the secret military nuclear programme focusing on weaponisation – to produce nuclear bombs.

In documents from the Iranian nuclear archives stolen in 2018 by Mossad and partially published in the media, evidence was seen of Fakhrizadeh’s involvement with Iran’s development of weapons – including a recording of his voice, in which he talks about five bombs and the need for tests.

Because of these suspicious, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency demanded to interview him twice, once a decade ago and again six years ago, but the request was rejected by the Iranian authorities.

It is not publicly known if Fakhrizadeh was working on weaponising Iran’s nuclear capabilities at the time of his death.

Western intelligence communities have tried to follow Fakhrizadeh, bug his phones and computers, and collect information about him.

Mossad went further and a few times even planned to kill him, but Fakhrizadeh was cautious, highly suspicious and evasive. He uncovered the plots against his life, went underground, and the security around him was doubled, around the clock.

In the end it was not sufficient. Eventually Mossad, using technological and digital surveillance, as well as agents on the ground, found soft spots in his security. On Sunday, Iran said that a satellite-controlled machine gun with “artificial intelligence” had been used to kill the scientist.

Avoiding the trap

The desire to assassinate a wanted man is not enough.

To carry out the plan, Mossad also needed accurate information and operational feasibility. Once Israel had acquired the desire, precise intelligence and logistical capabilities, only the question of timing – of why now – remained.

It was most likely that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is the ultimate authority in approving or denying whether Mossad chief Yossi Cohen can carry out such a mission, had consulted with outgoing US President Donald Trump.

Trump and his security and military aides must have been privy to the secret decision, because the US had to prepare itself for all eventualities, including the worst-case scenario: Iran deciding to retaliate by hitting US targets, such as its bases in Bahrain or Qatar.

This leads to the almost inevitable conclusion that Netanyahu and Trump hoped to provoke Iran.

Their hopeful scenario could have been that after Fakhrizadeh had been killed, Tehran would retaliate against the US, which would leave Trump with no choice but to declare war on Iran. If this was their plan, they wanted also to embarrass President-elect Joe Biden.

After their initial, emotional reaction, Iran’s leaders understood the Israeli-American conspiracy and decided not to fall into the trap.

Iran still seeks revenge and prepares its intelligence agencies to be ready. But Tehran anxiously awaits Biden and his incoming administration. It hopes that the Democrat will bring the US back into the 2015 nuclear deal, known as JCPOA, and lift the crippling sanctions Trump has imposed over the past two years.

All things considered, it is very unlikely that Iran will retaliate against US targets at all, and certainly not before Biden enters the White House on 20 January. The Iranians are looking beyond that date, however, in the knowledge that the new administration will need a few more months to formulate its policy and re-enter the nuclear deal, if it does so at all.

Yet Iran may eventually be disappointed. Contrary to how Netanyahu and US Republicans portray Biden, as weak and soft on Iran, he is not in Iran’s pocket. Biden wants to revive the nuclear deal and bring Iran into the international family of nations. But not at any cost.

Biden and some of his future cabinet nominees have hinted that they wish to improve the nuclear deal and close some of the loopholes in it. These include the notion of a “sunset” – when the agreement will expire – which Biden certainly doesn’t want to happen in 2025, as the original agreement stipulates.

He also hopes to persuade Iran to expand the deal so it will address the issues of long-range missiles, Iran’s destabilising interventions in the Middle East and its support for militant groups.

Limited options

In a way Iran is trapped. It desperately needs the sanctions to be lifted, otherwise with its deteriorating economy it will find itself in an economic, social and political catastrophe. 

But Tehran also, as a matter of national pride and due its inner divisions between reformists and conservatives, will find it difficult to further compromise.

On the other hand, Iran has no hesitations about its desire and readiness to strike Israeli targets. But its capabilities are limited.

It doesn’t want to launch its long-range missiles from its own soil, knowing that not only will Israel retaliate with an iron fist, but also it may leave the US no choice but to rush and help its ally.

The other punitive measure available for the Iranian strategic planners is to launch its missiles from Syria. But here, too, its hands are tied. Russia and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would not approve it, and again Israel would respond harshly.

Another possibility is that Iran will conduct cyber-warfare against major Israeli strategic sites and infrastructure. However, Israeli cyber-capabilities – defensive and offensive – are much more superior than Iran’s.

A year ago, Iran tried to strike Israeli critical infrastructure, but caused minimal damage to a few water pumps. However, a few years earlier it did manage to succeed in inflicting major damage to Saudi Arabia’s computers managing its oil industry.

The other option for Iran is to command its most reliable proxy, Hezbollah, to shower Israel with missiles from Lebanon. Yet, Iran, Hezbollah and the weak Lebanese government in Beirut know full well that any Israeli response would be swift and painful, to the point that Lebanon as a whole may collapse.

So, what is left for Iran is more of the same: to try to target Israelis abroad.

It has tried this in the past, after Mossad assassinated five Iranian scientists in the streets of Tehran between 2010-2012, and Hezbollah’s military chief Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in 2008.

Most of these Iranian efforts were thwarted by Israeli intelligence. There is no indication they would be more successful now.

Yossi Melman is an Israeli security and intelligence commentator and co-author of Spies Against Armageddon