Peiman Salehi
Informed Comment / February 28, 2026
[Update. In the midst of US negotiations with Iran in Oman, Israel on Saturday launched attacks on Iran. It is likely targeting the country’s remaining ballistic missiles and anti-aircraft capabilities. Last June’s 12-day war was also launched in the midst of negotiations between Iran and the U.S. – Juan Cole. ]
Peiman Salehi wrote before these developments:
Tehran – In recent remarks, Donald Trump emphasized that Iran “must not build a nuclear weapon” and should make this commitment explicit. At first glance, the statement appears consistent with long-standing U.S. policy. Washington has repeatedly declared that it will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Yet the wording marks a subtle but important shift from earlier maximalist demands that Tehran end uranium enrichment altogether. In high-stakes negotiations, such distinctions are rarely accidental.
For years, the debate centered on whether Iran should retain any enrichment capability at all. “Zero enrichment” functioned not merely as a technical demand but as a political signal of total rollback. The recent emphasis on weaponization instead of enrichment reframes the threshold. Preventing the construction of a bomb is a narrower objective than dismantling the entire enrichment infrastructure. That difference matters.
The timing of this rhetorical adjustment is also significant. A new round of indirect negotiations is underway, and both sides appear to be testing language as much as policy. Iranian officials have consistently maintained that their program is peaceful and that they do not seek nuclear weapons. If Tehran were to reiterate this position in a formal or diplomatically structured way, it could create space for Washington to claim success without insisting on the more expansive demand of eliminating enrichment capacity altogether.
Such recalibration does not necessarily signal concession. It may reflect caution.
A large-scale military confrontation with Iran would not remain geographically contained. Iranian officials have repeatedly indicated that escalation would not be limited to their own territory. The Gulf region — through which roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes — sits at the center of this calculation. Any serious disruption to maritime transit routes would reverberate beyond the Middle East.
The implications extend further. A substantial portion of Gulf energy exports flows toward East Asian economies, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea — countries deeply embedded in global manufacturing networks and supply chains. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would therefore represent not only a regional security crisis but a systemic economic shock. In an already fragile global economy, such a scenario carries risks that extend far beyond the immediate theater of conflict.
Washington is acutely aware of these structural realities. Escalation risks destabilizing energy markets, straining relations with Gulf partners who are wary of becoming battlegrounds, and triggering inflationary pressure in interconnected supply chains. Even absent full-scale war, sustained tension in the Gulf raises costs. Against this backdrop, a rhetorical move from “zero enrichment” to “no nuclear weapon” may reflect strategic prudence rather than ideological retreat.
Domestic political considerations also play a role. Trump has consistently framed his foreign policy around strength and decisive leadership. Demonstrating the capacity to neutralize threats without becoming entangled in protracted wars aligns with that narrative. In recent months, he has portrayed himself as capable of reshaping diplomatic tracks — including in other conflict zones — through direct and unconventional initiatives. Not all of these efforts have been warmly received by traditional allies, particularly in Europe, where some have expressed concern about being sidelined in major security discussions.
This pattern is relevant to the Iran file. Trump’s approach has often prioritized visible outcomes that can be presented as personal diplomatic achievements. If Iran were to issue an explicit declaration reaffirming that it does not seek nuclear weapons, Washington could characterize such a statement as validation of deterrent pressure. In that scenario, the administration could claim that firmness produced results — without crossing the threshold into open war.
None of this eliminates the possibility of escalation. Military assets remain deployed, and mistrust runs deep on both sides. Rhetoric can harden quickly, and miscalculation is always possible in tense environments. Yet the current framing suggests that Washington’s red line is being articulated more narrowly than before. The distinction between enrichment capability and weaponization may provide diplomatic manoeuvring room where previously there was little.
For regional actors, this nuance is consequential. Gulf states, while reliant on U.S. security guarantees, have demonstrated little enthusiasm for becoming staging grounds for a broader confrontation. Economic interdependence and energy stability are shared concerns. A conflict that engulfs shipping lanes or infrastructure would impose costs on allies as well as adversaries.
Ultimately, the question is not whether tensions will disappear. The United States and Iran remain divided over sanctions, regional influence, and security architecture. But shifts in language often precede shifts in policy. By redefining the operative red line from enrichment to weaponization, Washington may be lowering the immediate probability of large-scale conflict while preserving its deterrent posture.
If this interpretation proves correct, the emerging posture would reflect not weakness, but calculation: a recognition that leadership can be demonstrated through restraint as well as force. In the volatile landscape of the Gulf, that distinction may carry more weight than it first appears.
Peiman Salehi is an Iranian political analyst and writer working at the intersection of political philosophy and international affairs
