Mayssoun Sukarieh
Mondoweiss / March 14, 2026
As Israel plans on occupying southern Lebanon and replicating its Gaza onslaught, Lebanese society remains deeply divided. Israel is exploiting these differences to tear Lebanon apart — its political system, state institutions, and social fabric.
On March 2, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel after the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The following day, the Israeli army issued a blanket evacuation order for virtually all of Beirut and southern Lebanon, causing the displacement of well over a million people at the time of writing.
Early this morning, Axios reported that Israel is planning a “massive” ground invasion of southern Lebanon, reportedly aimed at seizing “the entire area” south of the Litani, with one senior Israeli official reportedly telling the outlet that “We are going to do what we did in Gaza.”
This comes after comments from hardline Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich that Beirut’s southern Dahiya district — home to the predominantly Shi’a community from which Hezbollah draws its base of support — will “soon resemble Khan Younis,” which was heavily destroyed by the Israeli army during its military campaign in Gaza.
And like with Gaza, Israeli strikes have also targeted critical infrastructure, power stations, water systems, and telecommunications, rendering areas increasingly uninhabitable. Israel has been targeting cement factories and brick workshops in the south as a clear message that no return to these border villages is allowed. Israel has also sprayed cancer-linked herbicide in the southern buffer zone.
The war in Lebanon clearly isn’t about disarming Hezbollah anymore. Increasingly, the Israeli strategy seems aimed at removing Hezbollah as a political force altogether. A Lebanese joke has it that Israel wants “de-Hezbollahification” — extracting, uprooting, and erasing the movement from Lebanon’s Shi’a community, from which it draws its membership, and from Lebanon’s political life. This is in reference to the de-Hamasification project Israel wants to implement in Gaza, and of course, the mother project of the U.S., Iraq’s de-Ba’athification.
As for the reaction of Lebanese society and politics to this Israeli goal, reactions have been split, a product of the deep sectarian-political differences that have scarred Lebanese society since the Civil War, which began during the mid-1970s.
Regarding the current Israeli onslaught, intra-Lebanese disputes even differ on when it all began. There is no single narrative of the war’s timeline in the country. Depending on political affiliation, the timeline begins either on October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah opened what it called a “support front” for Gaza, or on March 2, 2026, when the most recent escalation began.
For one part of the Lebanese population, this war goes back to October 8, 2023, with a first phase in which the conflict remained largely confined to border exchanges of rockets and artillery. But in mid-September, Israel set off its infamous exploding pager operation, and on September 23, it launched a major wave of airstrikes across Lebanon. The onslaught culminated with the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, and the escalation eventually ended with a ceasefire agreement by November 27, 2024.
For another section of the Lebanese population — as well as Israel and the mainstream media — the current war started on March 2, 2026, when Hezbollah launched rockets toward northern Israel.
Some analysts now argue that this may be one of the most dangerous wars Lebanon has faced, perhaps even more threatening to the country than the 1982 Israeli invasion.
While Israel claims it faces an existential threat, many Lebanese believe the existential danger is actually confronting Lebanon itself: its state institutions, its political system, and its social fabric.
A country as divided as ever over the war
Lebanese reactions to the war remain at odds, one could argue more so than previous wars, or perhaps it is the circumstances of this war that allowed some to openly say what they could not when Hezbollah was still strong and hegemonic in the country, when Nasrallah was still alive.
Broadly speaking, three positions have emerged in reaction to the war.
The first is the pro-resistance camp, composed mainly of the Shi’a movements Amal and Hezbollah, along with smaller Sunni Islamist groups, such as the Jama’a al-Islamiyya, and remnants of Arab nationalist parties, such as the Nasserists. Supporters of this camp argue that Israel intended to attack Lebanon regardless, and that Hezbollah is defending the country rather than acting on behalf of Iran.
The second camp opposes Hezbollah’s military actions. This group includes the Lebanese government and parties such as the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces, as well as pro-Gulf political currents associated with figures like Saad Hariri.
Since the ceasefire, the Lebanese government has pursued a diplomatic approach aimed at recovering occupied land while also addressing international demands to disarm Hezbollah. During this time, Israel continued to launch regular airstrikes against Hezbollah targets across Lebanon.
During repeated visits to Beirut, the U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack delivered blunt warnings to Lebanese officials, urging them to deal with Hezbollah’s weapons. He earned the title of “High Commissioner” — the historic colonial office governing British colonies — since his role was to instruct the Lebanese government how to disarm Hezbollah, but never to criticize the Israeli violations of the ceasefire.
Barrack criticized Lebanon’s political culture, saying it had long relied on “deny, detour, and deflect,” and warned that the country risked being left behind as regional dynamics moved at “Mach speed.” He also emphasized that Hezbollah’s weapons were “a Lebanese problem” that Lebanese authorities must resolve themselves. According to Barrack, if Beirut delays action, Israel might intervene unilaterally, leading to severe consequences.
Barrack was echoing warnings issued by Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel would “support” Lebanon in efforts to disarm Hezbollah while also warning that Israel would continue to act militarily if Hezbollah remained armed along the border. `
Similarly, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said that “Israel will continue to remove any threat to our citizens,” referring to Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon. Israeli officials also warned that if Beirut failed to enforce ceasefire commitments requiring armed groups to withdraw or disarm, Israel would act in “self-defense” against Hezbollah targets, signalling that Lebanon could face renewed strikes or escalation if the group’s weapons and positions were not dismantled.
In fact, Israel was already launching regular strikes against Hezbollah targets this entire time, in clear violation of the November 2024 ceasefire, which Hezbollah respected. According to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), more than 10,000 Israeli violations were documented through late 2025. The Lebanese government reported over 5,350 violations within the first twelve months of the truce, including air, sea, and ground breaches, killing at least 500 Lebanese people, most of them Hezbollah members, but also at least 127 civilians.
Despite all these Israeli violations, when Hezbollah fired rockets on March 2 weeks ago, the Lebanese government immediately condemned them, banned Hezbollah activities, and declared that “the decision on war and peace belongs exclusively to the Lebanese state.” The cabinet also demanded that all weapons be placed under state authority and instructed security forces to prevent unauthorized military actions from Lebanese territory.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that Lebanon had been “drawn into a devastating war that we did not seek and did not choose,” emphasizing the need to address the humanitarian crisis and assist displaced populations.
This stance reflects the government’s broader alignment with Gulf states and its effort to distance itself from Iran.
The resurgence of pro-Israeli Lebanese forces
The blows that Hezbollah received since the 2024 war, particularly after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, its involvement in Syria, and the collapse of its strategic corridor through Syria, weakened its hegemony in Lebanon. Debates about peace with Israel — once largely taboo — have begun appearing openly in Lebanese political discourse. In February 2026, the Phalange Party even organized a public debate on the possibility of peace with Israel.
The race for peace with Israel is not only confined to the Phalange Party with its history of connections with Israel, but a growing part of the Lebanese society are open to this idea, including artists and political commentators and other groups.
And while this war threatens demographic and geographic changes to the country, the debate has revolved around assigning blame for how the conflict began and who bears the brunt of the responsibility, overlooking the fact that Israel has never stopped bombing Lebanon. This was exacerbated by Hezbollah’s claim that the rockets were in revenge for the assassination of Khamenei — and “to defend the Lebanese people” — which led to endless debates whether Hezbollah took permission from Iran or acted on its own.
A controversial belief among some Lebanese groups is that Israeli intervention could weaken Hezbollah and eventually benefit Lebanon politically. As argued before, Israel has a golden opportunity to remake Lebanon in its own interests, and it is not going to get rid of Hezbollah and hand the country over to the Lebanese without intervention.
A third group in Lebanon rejects both Iran’s regional role and Israeli military domination. This position, often associated with parts of the Lebanese left and independent journalists, criticizes Iran’s interventions in Syria and elsewhere but also fears that an Israeli victory would lead to prolonged occupation. These are the lower voices, not yet effective in political life.
These divisions have started to reflect on the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a statement today by a group that calls itself the Nationalist Officers, criticizing the government’s stance, calling Israel an enemy that is occupying Lebanese land, and promising to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty. Some think that this might lead to a similar scenario of 1976, when the Syrian army was invited to Lebanon by international agreement, to crush the PLO.
The war in Lebanon is unfolding as part of a broader regional conflict at a moment when international institutions appear largely paralyzed. Organizations such as the United Nations and the UN Security Council have been paralyzed. As a result, Lebanon finds itself confronting a major war without strong international mechanisms to guarantee its security.
Many Lebanese now fear that even if the wider regional war ends, Israel’s military ambitions in Lebanon may not, and the war could be prolonged. This fear is grounded in many official Israeli statements that the war with Iran does not mean an end to their aggression against Lebanon, not to mention the recent announcement of an impending ground operation in the south. This fear is reinforced by the perception that Israel has operated with significant impunity, while Iran has shown little capacity to negotiate an end to Israeli occupation in Lebanon. Gulf states have also refrained from exerting meaningful pressure to end previous wars, and they won’t for this one.
France reportedly proposed a new ceasefire plan that included the disarmament of Hezbollah, but the proposal was rejected by both the United States and Israel, which demanded the complete removal of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, similar to the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in 1982. In other words, Hezbollah fights an existential war much like the Iranian government. But it is also an existential war for Lebanon’s social and political fabric.
Israel moves to occupy southern Lebanon
Some Lebanese analysts fear that the long-term objective may be either a sustained occupation or a form of external tutelage over Lebanon similar to the situation in the West Bank, where governance and territorial control remain deeply contested.
A part of these fears seems to have been confirmed, given the initial news of a planned ground invasion in all of the south.
During the ceasefire period, Israeli forces continued to seize land in parts of southern Lebanon. Jewish settlers also entered some of these areas and called for the construction of settlements. Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that the broader goal of the current war is to reshape the Middle East. Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have both framed the conflict as part of a wider effort to redefine the region’s political order. Some Israeli political discourse, particularly within right-wing nationalist circles, has invoked ideas associated with the concept of “Greater Israel.”
What this all leads to is clear: the Israeli government is openly saying it will do in Lebanon what it did to Gaza, which amounts to the destruction of an entire society. And while Lebanon is faced with an existential war that threatens its very cohesion, elements of Lebanese politics are siding with the force that has said it will tear their country apart.
Mayssoun Sukarieh is a member of the research committee at the Institute of Palestine Studies
