Ori Goldenberg
New Lines Magazine / September 27, 2024
The country’s military has invaded Lebanon three times in the last 50 years but has never emerged victorious. Does anyone believe this time will be different ?
What is Israel doing in Lebanon? Before we delve into the byzantine brew that sustains Israel’s Lebanese “operation,” we must give the one answer we know to be true. Israel is killing Lebanese, nearly a thousand so far this month alone, in a combination of sabotage — the exploding pagers and walkie-talkies on Sept. 17 and 18 — and sustained, unchecked bombing. The indifference with which Israel kills, with explanations ranging from “they shouldn’t have had a missile in their garage” to “bad things happen to good people in war,” does not detract from the enormity of the killing. As it seeks to “dismantle Hezbollah” (Hamas is “eradicated,” in case you’re confused) Israel is killing a host of Lebanese, many of them innocent civilians.
That said, what is Israel doing in Lebanon? Or rather, what does Israel want in Lebanon? What is it seeking to accomplish with its sustained, unchecked attacks on Lebanon in its entirety? There are different answers to these questions. Civilian Israelis and the various branches of Israeli officialdom want different things, but all the answers begin with Israel’s civilian quandary. Nearly 100,000 Israelis evacuated their homes in the north of Israel after the Hamas massacre on Oct. 7. They left because Israel’s officials as much as told them that Hezbollah was planning its own version of the massacres that Hamas perpetrated in the south. They haven’t returned because the north has been under continual Hezbollah bombardment since Oct. 8, while the army has warned that it cannot guarantee any type of protection to those who choose to go home. In any case, they didn’t need much telling. The general sense in Israel has for some time been that an Iranian-orchestrated attack on multiple fronts was imminent. Israelis could not imagine that Hamas managed to pull off the Oct. 7 attack without Iranian assistance. Where Iranians were, Israelis believed, Hezbollah could not be far behind.
Since leaving their homes, they have been housed in various ways all over the country. For nearly a year, they have been living in temporary housing, often in three-star hotels, where whole families live in a single room. Neither the army nor the government has provided any information about when they will be able to return home, so they live with complete uncertainty about the future. Provisional schools have been opened for their children but their shuttered businesses in the empty north are, well, their problem — as are the rents and mortgages that they must continue to pay for houses and apartments they may not occupy. Their situation is not sustainable. They must be returned home. But Israel’s north is under continuous Hezbollah fire. These Israelis are reluctant to go home because they feel they have been abandoned by the state. And since November 2023, that state has been repeatedly telling them and itself that the only solution to this problem is a war that would push Hezbollah back from the Israeli-Lebanese border.
The 2006 war lasted 34 days and killed approximately 1,200 Lebanese and 44 Israelis. It ended with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a negotiated solution that would ensure that the Lebanese army would deploy between Israel and Hezbollah, but these negotiations never began because neither side was interested. Israelis often claim that Hezbollah is in violation of this resolution. That claim is mendacious; both sides were supposed to negotiate a solution, but neither side was interested in entering negotiations. Israelis also like to stare at their interlocutor and ask: “How do you expect us to live with those animals on our border? They want to destroy us!” And so, war becomes the only option. Nobody thinks of it as a desirable option. For some, it will provide a segue into the new Israeli age, one which foregoes the fictions of “peace” and embraces constant war on all fronts. But for most Israelis, war is not welcome; it is simply inevitable.
Still, what is the point of this war? To what end is it being waged? The answer depends on whom you ask. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants a war but is afraid to start one, because he does not want to carry sole blame if the military campaign fails. For Israelis, it isn’t a war until the army initiates a ground invasion. Netanyahu knows that the Israeli public supports a war (just like it supports the war in Gaza) but that the same public distrusts his motivations. A war, one forcing exhausted Israelis to march into Lebanon for the third time in 50 years, will be seen as Netanyahu’s war. Netanyahu remains hopeful that Hassan Nasrallah will at some point lose his patience or, even better, that Iran will join the fray. If this happens, he will have the justification he needs to invade Lebanon, being able to present it as a war of self-defense. Until then, Netanyahu is happy to see the air force undertake aerial bombardments and happy enough to allow his formerly estranged defense minister, Yoav Gallant, to take credit for dismantling Hezbollah. After all, this is exactly what he did in Gaza. The carpet bombings were presented as a systematic attempt to “eradicate Hamas.” The various horrors of the ground invasions (yes, plural; Israel has “retaken” various parts of the Gaza Strip more than once) were also directed against Hamas and the civilians were either “human shields” or “Hamas supporters and enablers.” If Netanyahu doesn’t get his war, he will leave it to Gallant to declare “mission accomplished” and will then accept or reject credit as circumstances dictate.
The Israeli military wants a war but also doesn’t want a war. Lebanon is an arena in which it might attempt to mitigate the catastrophic failures of Gaza. After all, the army set itself two goals for the Gaza war — returning the hostages and eradicating Hamas — and has accomplished neither. Lebanon offers unspoiled territory for “action” and the assurance of U.S. support. The Americans have had it in for Hezbollah since the 1983 suicide bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 people, and American grievances run long and deep. “Performing” in Lebanon, Israel’s military leaders hope, will lessen the humiliation experienced in Gaza to some extent. Hezbollah is a more formidable foe, but it is also a more organized and accessible foe than Hamas. It has identifiable explosives depots, it has been penetrated by Israeli intelligence and its command structure is professional and somewhat detached from the local population. Israel could win a war in Lebanon. The Israeli military desperately needs a win.
But the military also doesn’t want a war. Its leadership knows that, after 11 months of fighting in Gaza, the resilience of the troops is as low as it has ever been. It knows that its armament situation is not great, even with promised U.S. support, while many of Israel’s allies are now quietly refraining from supplying it with weapons. The Israeli military also knows that there is no possibility of “dismantling Hezbollah” without a deep, lengthy and highly lethal invasion of Lebanon. Israel is failing in its war of attrition in Gaza. There is no reason to assume that it would be more successful in a war of attrition with Lebanon. This assessment, of course, applies to a situation where Iran stays out of the conflict. If Iran enters and another projectile front opens up in the Israeli heartland, the generals know who will be blamed for the unsustainable failure, especially if Netanyahu remains prime minister.
The Israeli military would appreciate a “display of force” (necessarily involving the death of as many Lebanese citizens as might be required) that would bring about a Hezbollah concession of defeat. What would such a concession entail? First of all, holding fire. But what comes after holding its fire? Would the negotiations stipulated in Resolution 1701 finally begin? Why would Hezbollah trust Israel to carry out and respect the results of such negotiations? After all, it is the opposition to Netanyahu that is currently promoting the slogan “Bring them back [the hostages] and go back [to fight Hamas in Gaza].” Who’s to say Israel will not attempt to pull a similar trick? The Israeli military knows and understands this. It doesn’t trust Hezbollah, either. Therefore, the potentially desirable outcome described above is, effectively, a nonstarter.
This is compounded by a lack of consensus among decision-makers. The infantry, from which most Israeli army generals hail, feels underappreciated for its achievements in Gaza and would be grateful for a shot at redemption. Military intelligence was happy to supply targets for bombing but is also painfully aware that Hezbollah’s ability to inflict major damage on Israel has not been harmed. Mossad and Shin Bet, Israel’s nonmilitary intelligence services, remain devoted to tactical achievement but profoundly incapable (and unwilling) to offer any kind of strategic framing for Israel’s predicament. And Netanyahu, as suggested above, needs a war but is politically wary of one. Despite the complications of Gaza and the extremely difficult fighting conditions, it was, in Israeli eyes, a fully justified war. A war in Lebanon is not inherently justified.
If so, what then? Is there any positive solution that might be applied to this intractable situation? The obvious answer is that Israel can flip its attention once again to Gaza and reach a cease-fire deal there. If it does so, it can test Hezbollah, given that the organization has repeatedly committed to holding its fire unilaterally should a cease-fire come into effect in Gaza. Placing the onus on Hezbollah’s shoulders would be a real triumph for Israel, now seen as the main agent of chaos by most of the world. Can Israel find the political maturity to do so? I wonder. The Israeli establishment is not what it was a year ago. Ranks and minds have closed since Oct. 7. The Israeli consensus — grim, reluctant, tenacious — has broadened to envelop just about the entire traditional political spectrum from left to right. Israelis now believe that they deluded themselves for decades with thoughts of peace and coexistence. The truth, they insist, is that when left to their own devices, Palestinians (well, Arabs and Iranians) want to destroy Israel. That is the alpha and the omega of Israel’s predicament. Destruction is a total cause. It cannot be met with moderation. Israel must be prepared to destroy.
Ori Goldberg is a former university professor who has written extensively on Iran, Israel and the relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East
