Sam Hamad & Saber Gul Anbari
The New Arab / August 10, 2026
Iran’s new security chief is an IRGC veteran, establishment hardliner and pragmatic operator now central to talks over Hormuz.
Tehran – Iran has appointed veteran Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaee to one of the country’s most powerful security posts at a pivotal moment for Tehran, as it negotiates over the Strait of Hormuz and recalibrates its position after the war.
Rezaee (71) was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on Sunday, replacing Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr after just four months in the post.
The appointment came immediately after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei named Rezaee as one of his two personal representatives on the council, alongside former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.
It places a figure who has served at the heart of the Islamic Republic since its earliest years in charge of coordinating its military, diplomatic and security establishment at another critical moment.
From revolutionary commander to establishment politician
Born Mohsen Sabzevar Rezaee Mirgha’ed in 1954, Rezaee joined the revolutionary movement against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi before the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
He rose extraordinarily quickly afterwards. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appointed him commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 1981, when he was just 27.
Rezaee commanded the Guards throughout most of the Iran-Iraq war and remained in charge until 1997, overseeing their transformation from a revolutionary armed force into one of the Islamic Republic’s central military and political institutions.
His career has consequently spanned successive generations of Iran’s leadership. Elevated by Khomeini, he remained close to the centre of power under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, later serving for more than two decades as secretary of the Expediency Council.
He has repeatedly stood for president and served as vice-president for economic affairs under Ebrahim Raisi, but his enduring influence has come less through elections than through the Islamic Republic’s unelected institutions.
Internationally, Rezaee remains controversial. Argentine prosecutors have accused him of involvement in the decision-making behind the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. He denies involvement.
A different kind of hardliner
Rezaee is firmly rooted in Iran’s conservative revolutionary establishment, but his politics have differed significantly from the populist radicalism associated with former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
He challenged Ahmadinejad in the disputed 2009 presidential election and criticised his economic record and confrontational approach abroad.
Rezaee also criticised Ahmadinejad’s repeated Holocaust denial, arguing that pursuing the issue damaged Iran diplomatically without advancing its interests.
He is therefore better understood as an establishment hardliner: committed to the Islamic Republic, the IRGC and Iran’s support for Palestinian and regional resistance movements, but generally more institutional and pragmatic in his approach to statecraft.
That distinction may be particularly important in understanding his appointment now.
Why Rezaee, and why now ?
The reshuffle comes amid reported disagreements inside Iran over the conduct of both war and negotiations.
President Masoud Pezeshkian himself acknowledged on Saturday that “there are a number of disagreements being discussed, and we are working to address and overcome them”.
Iranian analyst Ali Gholhaki told The New Arab that the SNSC had reached “a state of procrastination in decision-making” over negotiations – or, under a more pessimistic interpretation, “non-decision”.
He argued that the council needed “greater experience, greater dynamism, stronger authority and new blood”, describing Rezaee’s appointment as necessary despite the unusual decision to replace Zolghadr after only four months.
Reports have also suggested Pezeshkian had reservations about Rezaee taking the role, with the supreme leader’s decision to appoint Rezaee as his representative apparently settling the matter.
The timing is particularly significant as Iran considers negotiations involving the Strait of Hormuz and its wider relationship with the US.
Rezaee’s background gives him substantial authority within the military establishment, while his decades inside Iran’s political institutions give him experience of negotiation and bureaucratic consensus-building.
Iranian analyst Hamid Asefi told The New Arab that combining the roles of council secretary and supreme leader’s representative directly connects “the directives of the highest leadership with the executive mechanisms for coordination and follow-up”.
Gholhaki expects the change to produce a tougher negotiating position, arguing that Tehran will now seek greater concessions rather than retreat from diplomacy altogether.
That may be the clearest indication of what Rezaee’s appointment means. Iran has not chosen between negotiation and confrontation.
Instead, it has placed one of the architects of the IRGC in charge of coordinating both – an establishment hardliner trusted by the supreme leadership, but one whose career suggests pragmatism about how Iran’s strategic objectives are pursued.
