Charles Lister
Foreign Policy / March 27, 2025
The Syrian government wants peace with its neighbours. Israel has other ideas.
In the past six weeks, the Israeli military has launched at least 70 ground incursions into southwestern Syria and conducted at least 31 sets of airstrikes across Syria. The intensity of Israel’s ground and air actions in Syria has sharply increased as the country’s profoundly fragile transition seeks to pull the country back together after nearly 14 years of debilitating conflict.
On March 25, the situation escalated sharply, when an attempted 71st ground incursion was met by approximately 10 local gunmen who, according to local sources who spoke to me shortly afterwards, had opened fire into the air in an attempt to deter the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from entering their village of Koya. The IDF—claiming they had been fired upon directly—proceeded to fire tank shells into the village and launch at least one airstrike, leaving at least six people dead.
Israel’s response to Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power on Dec. 8, 2024, was immediately made clear when the IDF launched more than 600 airstrikes across Syria in the 10 days after Assad’s departure. As its aircraft hit nearly every military base and post across the country, IDF troops crossed into Syria, occupying the entire buffer zone established by the 1974 disengagement agreement between the two countries—effectively shredding that long-standing accord. Since then, IDF forces have advanced at least 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) deeper into Syrian territory—laying minefields, paving new access roads, and triggering civilian displacement.
Since late February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have declared and acted upon a new policy—demanding the total demilitarization of southern Syria. They have also repeatedly expressed their determination to defend Syria’s Druze communities from perceived threats. Until now, that latter policy has revealed itself in two forms.
The first was focused around an incident in early March, when Israel threatened to launch a military intervention to defend Druze gunmen in the southern Damascus suburb of Jaramana. That threat came after a local Druze militia composed of former Assad regime fighters—known locally as Shabiha—shot and killed an interim government soldier who had sought to visit relatives in their territory, leading to a standoff.
While Israel’s threats were being made, the most powerful Druze militias travelled north from their bases in Suwayda to Jaramana to negotiate and co-enforce a deal in which the gunmen suspected to be responsible for the killing were surrendered for prosecution and Jaramana was placed fully under interim government control.
The second manifestation of the new policy comes in the form of a new Druze militia formation known as the Suwayda Military Council (SMC). According to four senior Druze military, political, and religious figures in Suwaydaall of whom spoke to me on the condition of anonymity—the SMC has three former Assad regime generals among its senior leadership and armed itself from former Syrian Army stocks. It is well known within the Druze community that the SMC maintains ties to Israel via Druze counterparts in Israel.
Intriguingly, the SMC’s flag also bears a striking resemblance to that of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the United States’ partners in the fight against the Islamic State, which have at times signalled an openness to an Israeli relationship. It was SMC operatives who hoisted an Israeli flag in Suwayda’s city center amid the standoff in Jaramana—only for locals to tear it down and set it on fire minutes later.
The latest deadly escalation in Syria represents an extraordinarily dangerous moment—and an unnecessary one, at that.
Assad’s fall dealt Iran its greatest strategic defeat to date—completely crippling Tehran’s stranglehold over Syria and forcing its entire military and proxy infrastructure to flee the country and demobilize. Since Assad fell nearly four months ago, not one attack has targeted Israel from Syria. And during that time, the country’s interim government security forces have intercepted at least 18 weapons shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and seized and dismantled at least eight formerly Iranian-linked rocket launch sites.
Since assuming power in December, Syria’s interim government has been explicit in seeking a problem-free posture with its neighbours and the international community at large. Despite facing its military wrath for close to a decade, the new authorities in Damascus now have a regular and increasingly fruitful exchange with Russia—whose troops remain in their air and naval bases on the Mediterranean coast.
The pragmatism required to pull off such a diplomatic about-turn would be impressive for professional politicians—but in Syria, it comes from battle-hardened Islamists who now seek to stabilize Syria and reintegrate it into the international fold.
Since late January, Turkey has presented a major military proposal with Syria’s interim government that would include the deployment of fighter jets and air defense systems in two airbases (Shayrat and T-4) in central Syria in an attempt to establish sovereignty over Syria’s airspace. It’s clear that the proposal represents a direct Turkish challenge to Israeli freedom of action and given the significance of recent Israeli escalations, we may now be on the brink of such a defense accord being signed – according to one senior official in the interim government in Damascus, speaking strictly on the condition of anonymity.
To their credit, interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani had politely held off on committing to Turkey’s proposal—knowing well that it would trigger a serious, if not potentially existential crisis for their already fragile transition. But the trajectory of ongoing events makes such pragmatism increasingly unfeasible.
There is some irony to the fact that for now, in addition to Israel, the only other government in the world that appears to be seeking Syria’s destabilization is Iran.
In recent weeks, an increasingly capable and aggressive anti-government insurgency has developed in Syria structured around former commanders of the Assad regime’s elite Fourth Division—Iran’s primary Syrian military ally. A coordinated campaign of dozens of near-simultaneous attacks by their fighters in Latakia and Tartus were the trigger for a wave of massive retaliatory killings over several days, starting late on March 7. A raid conducted by Syria’s interim security forces on this division’s operational headquarters led to the discovery of brand-new satellite maps, crates of U.S. dollars, and long-range communications equipment, according to two senior officials who I spoke with—evidence that the interim government has chosen not to publicize, they said.
The Trump administration may harbour its own concerns and scepticism about Syria’s interim government, but it is also aware of the historic and strategic opportunity presented by Assad’s departure and Iran’s strategic defeat at the heart of the Middle East.
To grasp that opportunity and turn it into transformational regional stability, the Trump administration must use its rapport and influence with Israel to press for de-escalation. On its current path, Israeli aggression risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby a new Syria that once refused to present any hostile intent may end up having no choice but to respond if such unprovoked and deadly aggression continues to worsen.
The Trump administration may hope that post-Assad Syria will one day consider officially recognizing Israel by signing onto the Abraham Accords. But that will only be possible if Israel ceases its military action and illegal territorial occupation there.
Charles Lister is a senior fellow and director of the Syria and Counterterrorism and Extremism programs at the Middle East Institute
