ICG / October 8, 2024
Israel’s ground invasion of Lebanon represents a major escalation of its conflict with Hizbollah, which has been building alongside the war in Gaza for a year. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Heiko Wimmen, David Wood and Mairav Zonszein analyse the situation and the stakes.
What is Israel trying to achieve in Lebanon ?
On 1 October, Israel announced that its troops had crossed the border into southern Lebanon, nearly a year into its confrontation with the Shiite militia Hizbollah, which dates to immediately after Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks and Israel’s subsequent offensive in Gaza. The Israeli army later said it had been staging secret raids into southern Lebanon for months, but this operation threatens to be of much greater magnitude. Israel’s announcement came two weeks after it dramatically escalated what had become a war of attrition with Hizbollah – triggering explosives it had implanted in the group’s communications devices and launching massive airstrikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs, southern Lebanon and parts of the Beqaa Valley. The former attacks apparently killed or maimed hundreds of Hizbollah’s party cadres. The latter wiped out much of the group’s top brass, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Both rounds of attacks also killed and wounded many civilians.
The war between Israel and Hizbollah is bound up with the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Right after the latter broke out, Hizbollah announced it was opening a “support front” for its ally Hamas, shooting rockets at Israeli military installations in the Shebaa Farms, an area it says is part of Lebanon and Israel claims as part of the occupied Golan Heights. Israel returned fire. The sides subsequently traded blows across the border for eleven months. Already before the mid-September escalation, 600 people had been killed in Lebanon and over 110,000 displaced; some 50 people had been killed in Israel (as well as twelve Druze Syrian nationals in the occupied Golan) and up to 80,000 driven from their homes.
From the outset, Hizbollah said it would keep fighting until Israel agreed to a ceasefire in Gaza. Officially, the Lebanese government seeks a ceasefire and fulfilment of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah. Resolution 1701 stipulates that Hizbollah withdraw from southern Lebanon to north of the Litani River and that the Lebanese army deploy to the south in greater force. But the government lacks any influence over Hizbollah’s decisions and tactics, and it is in no position to make the group comply with the resolution’s requirements. Meanwhile, Israel has never accepted Hizbollah’s linkage of the Lebanese and Gazan fronts. Instead, it aims to impose a “new security reality” along its Lebanese border, separate from its operations in Gaza. In broad strokes, that means clearing the borderlands in Lebanon of Hizbollah’s rocket launchers, weapons caches and other assets it has used to fire on Israel, while forcing the group’s fighters who are now stationed in the south to move considerably north.
The U.S. and France tried to broker a ceasefire that would have seen Hizbollah withdraw its fighters to positions 7-10km north of the Israeli border and the Lebanese army dispatch more soldiers to southern Lebanon in their stead.
For much of 2024, the U.S. and France tried to broker a ceasefire that would have seen Hizbollah withdraw its fighters to positions 7-10km north of the Israeli border and the Lebanese army dispatch more soldiers to southern Lebanon in their stead. But this framework sat on a shelf for months, as Hizbollah refused to enter dialogue without a Gaza truce. As time went on, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government often appeared to be thwarting the ceasefire efforts. Israel kept troops in Gaza even though the army said it had done serious damage to Hamas’s combat brigades in the strip and the U.S. assessed that it could not do much more. With the cross-border exchanges increasing and demands by the tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to return to their homes in northern Israel intensifying, Israel shifted its focus to the confrontation with Hizbollah.
The new phase in Israel’s northern border campaign arrived with the 17 and 18 September attacks on Hizbollah rank and file carrying booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies. The explosions killed 42 and injured 3,500, including bystanders, and indicated that Israel was ramping up its operations. Israel followed these attacks with a bombing campaign in Lebanon’s south, the southern suburbs of Beirut and parts of the Beqaa Valley – all places where Hizbollah has many fighters, weapons and facilities. The bombardment, which Israel claims has destroyed over half the group’s arsenal, has come at a growing human cost, making clear that Israel has moved away from previous efforts to steer clear of risking civilian harm. At the same time, Israeli troops conducted what the army calls “localized” across the border, aimed at taking out Hizbollah assets in the south.
The extent of Israel’s war aims is not entirely clear. One objective appears to be severing the linkage Hizbollah has made between the Gaza and Lebanon fronts, so that Israel has freedom to act in Gaza without concern for any effects on the campaign in the north. Israel may also be trying to bolster its position in negotiations to achieve the “new security reality”, believing it can extract a more favourable agreement – though the precise terms of such a prospective accord are unclear. One question is whether a deal that would make Israeli civilians comfortable returning home would suffice – and what that would entail. But Israel may have bigger goals in any case: the penetration of Hizbollah’s communications network, the decision to kill Nasrallah, the bombing campaign aimed at the group’s commanders and arms depots, and the ground invasion may indicate a design to bring Hizbollah to its knees.
With the U.S. supporting Israel’s campaign – and some senior U.S. officials suggesting that it is an historic opportunity to decrease Hizbollah’s influence in Lebanon’s politics – Israel is emboldened to press on. Meanwhile, the toll on the Lebanese people has already been enormous. According to the Lebanese authorities, more than 2,000 have been killed, some 10,000 injured and well over one million displaced since 8 October 2023.
Does Nasrallah’s death spell Hizbollah’s demise ?
Probably not. Nasrallah headed the organization for 32 years, presiding over its rise from a resistance group in southern Lebanon to a strategic player in the whole Middle East. He also oversaw Hizbollah’s entry into Lebanese electoral politics and formal governance. He was the dominant actor on the Lebanese political scene, embodying the notion of “resistance” with his charismatic persona. But even so, Hizbollah is a political and social institution, as well as a militia, and it is unlikely to collapse because of an important leader’s death. Indeed, back in 1992, Nasrallah himself became secretary-general within 24 hours of Israel killing his predecessor, Abbas Musawi.
To be sure, Nasrallah’s killing was only the most dramatic in a string of blows to the organization since Israel escalated its attacks in mid-September, and these have clearly made an impact. For a few days after the mid-September escalation, the group was launching fewer rockets at Israel, rather than retaliating with added force, suggesting that its capabilities had sustained damage.
But there are also signs of resiliency. Rocket fire at northern Israel started ticking up again less than a week after Nasrallah’s death, suggesting that Hizbollah’s fighters have been able to regroup and that at least part of its chain of command is intact. On 8 October, the group fired 100 rockets at Haifa and its environs, the biggest barrage to date in the post-7 October 2023 conflict. One person was injured. The Israeli military announced on Telegram on 8 October that, all told, Hizbollah had fired 3,000 rockets since the 17 September pager attacks. The group also continues to project resolve: in public statements, Hizbollah members have displayed grim defiance, while the group’s popular base has demonstrated continued ideological commitment. On 30 September, just two days after Nasrallah was killed, the group’s acting secretary-general, Naim Qassem, asserted that Hizbollah had capable replacements for every slain official and commander. One measure of the group’s capacity to absorb the blows it has taken will be whether it can quickly recruit new members.
What is the Israeli public mood regarding the ground invasion of Lebanon ?
There is seeming consensus in Israel that a ground invasion was necessary. Israeli officials, politicians from the north and the displaced have been adamant that the army must ensure, at a minimum, that Hizbollah can no longer base fighters and weaponry near the border.
Unlike on the Gaza front, where the military establishment got behind a ceasefire-hostage deal that would see troops eventually withdrawn, there is near-consensus among Netanyahu’s rivals that Israel should have boots on the ground in Lebanon. Two prominent figures in Israel’s opposition – including Benny Gantz, a former general and defence minister who leads the centrist National Unity party, and Yair Golan, another former general and the new head of the traditionally centre-left Labour and Meretz faction – called for a ground operation, though both argued that Israel should use it as leverage for achieving a favourable negotiated settlement. The leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, also got behind the operation but called on Israel to define its strategic goals and take diplomatic steps to meet them. Some former security officials are encouraging Israel to make sure there is a political track alongside the military one that can turn operational gains into long-term security.
Netanyahu may also be buoyed by the improved approval ratings that have come with his pivot to the northern front over the past month.
Netanyahu may also be buoyed by the improved approval ratings that have come with his pivot to the northern front over the past month. The pager attacks and Nasrallah’s killing met with displays of glee in Israel, with a newscaster toasting the Hizbollah chief’s demise on the air and the education ministry encouraging schools to stage celebrations. Having seen Israel’s power projection and deterrence badly damaged on 7 October 2023, and having watched them erode further under Hizbollah’s continuous attacks for the next eleven months, Israeli military leaders appear to feel somewhat redeemed by the success at decapitating Hizbollah’s leadership and blowing up many of the group’s arms depots (and perhaps by Hizbollah’s limited retaliation to date). Israel has been preparing for such operations for nearly two decades, since its last war with Hizbollah in 2006. The euphoria faded somewhat on 1 October, when Iran fired around 200 ballistic missiles at Israel, putting the entire country on high alert and sending much of the population into shelters. Many of the missiles were intercepted, but satellite images suggest that at least two air bases were hit, indicating that Iran might be able to overwhelm Israeli air defences were it to launch another, even larger attack. In the meantime, however, the barrage may simply have increased Israel’s determination to proceed with the invasion.
What are the risks of a ground invasion for Israel ?
One of the main risks for Israel is that it becomes entangled in an expanding war without achieving its objectives. The recent successes do not mean the army is in for an easy time. Israel has staged ground invasions of Lebanon three times before, in 1978, 1982 and 2006, and on no occasion did it turn out as planned. In all these cases, Israel intended to conduct limited, targeted incursions. In 1978, however, it handed over swathes of territory to an unreliable proxy, the South Lebanon Army. Attacks by Palestinian guerrilla groups continued nevertheless, leading Israel to reinvade four years later. In 1982, it ended up maintaining a protracted occupation of larger parts of the south, giving impetus to formation of Hizbollah, which in turn helped push Israeli troops out in 2000. Israel’s 2006 campaign, in response to cross-border raids in which Hizbollah killed three Israeli soldiers and took two others captive (five more were killed in a failed rescue attempt), initiated a 34-day war that ended in stalemate. As for the present conflict, Israel may have superiority in the air, but fighting on Hizbollah’s home turf in the mountainous south leaves its troops vulnerable to ambush. A week into the present invasion, at least eleven Israeli soldiers have been killed in southern Lebanon. Israel claims it has killed at least 440 Hizbollah militants in that time.
Hizbollah also has advantages besides its long experience in guerrilla warfare. Its arsenal contains anti-tank and other rockets that are hard to intercept. It has dug tunnels under the border and to connect various spots in southern Lebanon, which Israel has begun to destroy. As with Hamas in Gaza, it is unclear that Israel is capable of neutralizing Hizbollah entirely, or sufficiently for its purposes, or how long an operation to achieve its objectives might take. The answers likely depend in part on how Israel will define the “new security reality” it seeks, since it is understandably skeptical that either the Lebanese army or the UN force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, can keep Hizbollah at bay. Israel might wind up occupying a strip of land in southern Lebanon as a buffer zone, or as leverage for future ceasefire talks, even if it now claims it is not interested in doing so.
How far Israel pushes into Lebanon will likely depend on whether its army can advance quickly and with losses acceptable to the Israeli public. It may seek to dismantle Hizbollah’s assets – including rocket launchers and tunnels – up to some 10km from the border, putting northern Israel beyond the reach of the short-range missiles that Hizbollah has used extensively during the conflict. But Hizbollah has also used missiles and drones with significantly longer ranges, which could lead Israel to decide that controlling the borderlands is insufficient for securing the towns in its north. If it presses forward and takes casualties for which the Israeli public is unprepared, then the military may decide to cut its losses. But it could also choose to advance further still to eliminate the source of attacks – perhaps miring it in Lebanon.
What is next for Israel ?
Israel has not publicly articulated a coherent plan for converting its recent military achievements into strategic gains. In particular, despite having demonstrated battlefield prowess, it is not clear that Israel has a vision for how to prevent a resumption of attacks from Lebanon after the incursions and bombardment end – nor for how the government can convince displaced residents to go home.
Absent a diplomatic solution, neither of Israel’s two options for safely returning the displaced residents appears likely to succeed in the short run. One is the long-term occupation of Lebanese territory, and the second is the attempted destruction of Hizbollah. The former approach may require that Israel extend its occupation elsewhere in Lebanon, including the Beqaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, where Hizbollah is also rooted in the population. Such a gambit, mimicking Israel’s approach in Gaza, could involve the imposition of a temporary security regime in those places to track down Hizbollah operatives and take apart the group’s extensive institutions. Yet a reprise of the previous occupation of southern Lebanon would be a drawn-out affair likely to inflict pain on Israel, in the form of continuous casualties among soldiers, a weaker economy and diplomatic isolation.
As for the second option, even with the recent successes, it is not evident that Israel has a better chance of rapidly eradicating Hizbollah than in 2006, especially considering that the army has been fighting for a year in Gaza and remains stretched both there and in the West Bank. More likely, Israel’s efforts will allow it to maintain its operational and tactical advantage while managing threats to the home front for an extended period, but without clear results.
In the meantime, both parties are locked into positions that make it difficult to envisage a near-term off-ramp from the hostilities, at least for the time being.
In the meantime, both parties are locked into positions that make it difficult to envisage a near-term off-ramp from the hostilities, at least for the time being. Hizbollah continues to condition halting its rocket fire at Israel upon a ceasefire in Gaza, and Israel still refuses to accept that linkage. There are some indications that Hizbollah might be prepared to revisit its bottom line, including accounts that Nasrallah had accepted a 21-day ceasefire proposed by the U.S. and France before his death, and the more recent statement by a Hizbollah member of parliament that a ceasefire in Lebanon is the group’s top priority. But the group’s formal position has not changed, and it may be seeking to sow a certain ambiguity about the question, in part to cast itself as reasonable in the eyes of the Lebanese public.
What might be the consequences of the Israeli invasion for Lebanese politics ?
Hizbollah’s domestic opponents have long chafed at the group’s dominance in Lebanese politics, and they may see its unexpected battering as an opportunity to secure political gains – but the risks of any such attempt would be great. These actors, such as the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb, both Christian parties, or what remains of the Future movement, a Sunni grouping, may find encouragement to this end from foreign powers. These external actors may seek to press Hizbollah into reaching a ceasefire on Israel’s terms or even to force the group to surrender its weapons once and for all. Israel and its allies may seek to prod the Lebanese government to confront Hizbollah’s residual power. In particular, they may propose charging the Lebanese army with bringing Hizbollah to heel. Whether the army could achieve that objective is unclear, and there is reason to fear that such a mission could compromise its integrity, with Shiite soldiers refusing to act against Hizbollah or deserting.
Furthermore, any such attempt could lead to widespread violence. Hizbollah, despite (or perhaps due to) its weakened position, would almost certainly push back against such efforts forcefully. The group might resort to assassinating Lebanese politicians identified with these policies (the party’s opponents accuse it of killing several rivals after 2005). It might mobilize its supporters for street clashes with other social and sectarian groups (as it did in October 2021, when a demonstration deteriorated into a firefight between Hizbollah and allied gunmen, on one side, and unidentified snipers, on the other). Hizbollah might even stage a coup, as it did in May 2008, when it took over the Western half of Beirut, compelling the cabinet to retract decisions the party saw as directed against its military wing and to accept formation of a national unity government on Hizbollah’s terms. These developments could result in strife between Shiite and Sunni Lebanese – two communities that make up much of the army’s fighting force and often live in proximity to each other. In these ways, efforts to rewire Lebanese politics – especially at this delicate moment – could instead pave the way for civil strife, if not war.
The displacement of over a million Lebanese, most of whom are Shiites fleeing from Hizbollah-controlled areas, can only exacerbate inter-communal tensions. Those without shelter might take to occupying vacant private property, particularly with the onset of winter. The Lebanese state’s official security organs might be unable to manage that situation indefinitely. Parties dominating affected areas might respond by organizing vigilante groups. To the extent that clashes occur in non-Shiite neighbourhoods, they could quickly assume a sectarian character. A concerted international relief effort, particularly to provide temporary shelters before winter arrives, may be required to avoid such scenarios.
