International Crisis Group / January 1, 2025
Trump’s return adds unpredictability to an already volatile world. As global tensions rise, change looms, whether through deals or by force of arms.
[…]Israel-Palestine
Israel’s assault on Gaza, launched in response to Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, has laid waste to the strip. The campaign, according to local authorities, has killed upwards of 45,000 Palestinians. Most were civilians—at least a third of them children. Thousands more bodies are missing, presumably under the rubble. Two thirds of buildings and infrastructure are damaged or in ruins, with entire neighbourhoods levelled.
While many Hamas leaders have been killed and the group’s military assets decimated, Western officials and even some Israelis quietly acknowledge that no authority can govern Gaza or carry out civil functions without Hamas’s acquiescence.
Israel’s operations are reshaping Gaza’s geography. It has dug into the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border. It has split Gaza through the Netzarim Corridor, in which a large military base now sits, and reportedly plans to bisect the strip’s south, too. It has besieged and all but emptied the area north of Gaza City, ostensibly to better combat or force out Hamas fighters, but in effect expelling hundreds of thousands of starving civilians. It has also expanded a pre-existing buffer zone along the strip’s perimeter with Israel.
What change incoming U.S. President Donald Trump will bring is unclear. He has reportedly told Netanyahu that he wants the Gaza war to end before he assumes office but without hinting at his terms. Overall, his cabinet picks mostly seem inclined to give Netanyahu an even freer hand.
Talks mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the United States have yet to yield a ceasefire. Diplomats still suggest that Hamas, in exchange for a pause, might release some hostages (roughly 100 captives, seized on 7 October, remain in Gaza, at least a third of whom are presumed dead). Such an agreement might, in principle, envisage further phases, with Israeli troop withdrawals, reconstruction, or some form of local rule.
But given the mood in Israel, it is hard to imagine subsequent phases happening, even if there is a deal. More likely is that the army stays in Gaza, keeping most Palestinians cornered in the south, surviving on humanitarian aid. Israeli sources suggest that vetted Palestinians might eventually move to “humanitarian bubbles”, with policing and aid delivery falling to foreign contractors or locals with ties to Israel, though it is hard to see that working. Either way, society in Gaza cannot recover any time soon.
Another battle lies in the West Bank, which Israel appears poised to annex.
Another battle lies in the West Bank, which Israel appears poised to annex. Under ultranationalist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, Israel is transferring the territory’s management from military to civilian control, extending sovereignty, ordering more Palestinian homes demolished, and legalising settler outposts. Even without formal annexation, Israel could further accelerate tactics it has used for years: moving more settlers in and squeezing Palestinians into tinier pockets by force.
Israel has weathered international opprobrium during previous Gaza wars, only for it to subside as the occupied territories returned to a grim routine. This time, though, the war’s aftermath is less clear because Israel has discarded even the pretence of political accommodation in favour of unapologetic repression. By trying to crush not only Hamas but Palestinian hopes of self-determination, Netanyahu and Israel’s political leaders appear to have made a series of bets: that security can be maintained through force without credible Palestinian partners; that international institutions and justice remain largely toothless; that Israel’s supporters will hold onto power in the United States and other Western capitals, despite mounting horror at what its army has done to Gaza; and that, in the end, Arab leaders will respect Israel’s might, notwithstanding its treatment of the Palestinians.
Perhaps the best, albeit slim, hope lies in the Gulf. Trump still wants Saudi Arabia to normalise diplomatic ties with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, the centrepiece of his first-term Middle East policy. Perhaps Riyadh, which rules out normalisation without a path to Palestinian statehood, can persuade him to lean on Israel to keep that option viable.
In Gaza, the U.S. failure to stop Israel’s campaign, despite supplying the bulk of the military aid it has relied on, and extract from Netanyahu a day-after plan has left the Israeli far right and military logic to define the strip’s future. It is all too plausible that the same happens for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict writ large.
Iran vs. U.S. and Israel
In the first half of 2024, Iran saw its Axis of Resistance – the Assad regime in Syria, and a collection of militant groups, including Hizbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza – as still providing the Islamic Republic a measure of protection and region-wide influence.
What a difference a few months can make. In July, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran. In September, Israel detonated hundreds of Hizbollah’s pagers and other devices, taking out much of its mid-level command. Airstrikes and a ground offensive followed, killing Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and decimating its ranks and military assets, while razing many villages. Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of October degraded its air defences and missile stores. As Syrian rebels ousted President Bashar al-Assad in early December, Iran lost an ally it had spent billions propping up, as well as the primary air and land routes it used to resupply Hizbollah.
Tehran still has thousands of ballistic missiles (in October, around 30 of 180 penetrated Israeli defences), plus allied militias in Iraq and the Houthis, which continue to fire on Israel from Yemen. Hizbollah may yet regroup. But around Israel’s perimeter, the Axis of Resistance, which Iran saw as a deterrent against Israeli or U.S. attacks, is broken. From Tehran’s perspective, it is also worrisome how capable Israel’s intelligence agencies are and how high its risk tolerance has become.
Tehran’s losses have not shifted its nuclear calculations yet, despite the obvious incentive to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Advances in Iran’s program since U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal mean its breakout time – the days needed to produce fissile material for a warhead – is virtually nil (mounting the warhead would take additional months). Clamour within the Iranian system for a bomb is getting louder. Yet, for now, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still seems to see nuclear concessions as a ticket to getting sanctions lifted and jumpstarting a stalled economy. He may also worry that Israeli or U.S. intelligence agencies could detect a dash toward weaponisation.
Some of Trump’s advisors, like some Israelis, see in Iran’s weakness a chance to cripple its nuclear program or even its government. Trying to topple the regime, which is unpopular but not brittle, would be folly. Its demise would trigger chaos like that of post-2003 Iraq, with the hardline Revolutionary Guards likely coming out on top. Even destroying nuclear sites, nestled deep underground, would require an air campaign involving bunker-busting munitions. Such strikes might push the regime, seeing existential peril, to respond with everything it has. While Tehran’s reach has often been overstated, thousands of missiles fired at Israel, together with attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Houthi strikes on Red Sea shipping lanes, could drag the United States into a war that Trump does not want.
A rebooted maximum pressure effort – ramping up sanctions and military action along the lines of Trump’s first-term policy, perhaps aimed at forcing Iran into greater compromise down the line – would be less bad but still dangerous. Certainly, sanctions can help diplomacy, but maximum pressure would throw fuel on a region already on fire. Gulf Arab powers, which cheered on Trump’s hawkish first-term approach but have since patched up relations with Tehran, warn that a repeat could bring escalation. Piling on pressure could also shut a window for diplomacy that is currently open. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appears to have Khamenei’s blessing to engage.
A better bet would be to start with talks, threatening to turn up the heat if they fail. Defining limits on Iran’s nuclear program will be harder than a decade ago, but full access for inspectors and eliminating enriched uranium stockpiles at near weapons-grade would be a start. Other provisions might be easier. The 2015 deal’s main flaw was its failure to curb Iran’s missile program and support for Middle East proxies, which underlay Gulf Arab discontent with the deal. This time around, with those proxies reeling or on their knees, a region-wide bargain might be more feasible. A chastened Iran might entertain previously unimagined concessions: not only nuclear checks but halting weapons shipments to Russia or an end to its support for militants in exchange for the United States pledging to not attack Tehran, or even an informal nonaggression pact with Israel.
[…]