International Crisis Group / May 19, 2026
In this weekly update, Crisis Group experts take stock of developments in the Middle East war and the progress of efforts to end it.
what happened
The impasse in U.S.-Iran negotiations persists. President Donald Trump’s two-day summit with President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 14-15 May seemingly ended with neither a Chinese commitment to put pressure on Tehran nor a substantive understanding concerning U.S.-Chinese coordination over the war that the U.S. and Israel have been waging with Iran since 28 February. Xi called for resuming dialogue about the Strait of Hormuz, offering vague support for diplomacy, while Trump, speaking aboard Air Force One after his departure, denied asking China for “any favours”. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi attended the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, where he described U.S.-Iran talks as having “almost reached a stalemate” on the nuclear issue. He again laid out the Iranian position that nuclear matters should be deferred to a later stage of talks. The U.S. and Iran nonetheless reportedly continued to trade proposals and counterproposals, with Tehran dispatching its latest iteration via Pakistani mediators over the weekend. Based on its initial reaction, Washington appeared to be largely unimpressed.
Meanwhile, the risk of a return to full-scale hostilities remains ever present. In one of his recurrent expressions of impatience, Trump said he was not considering any additional concessions to Iran, argued that “the clock is ticking” and warned of massive military action. Yet he later claimed that, at the request of the Saudi, Qatari and Emirati leaders, he was holding off on an attack – which he said had been scheduled for 19 May – in anticipation of renewed diplomatic efforts and the prospect of a deal.
The only concrete, if partial, diplomatic result in the past week came on the Lebanon front. A third round of U.S.-facilitated Israel-Lebanon talks in Washington on 14-15 May ended with a 45-day extension of the 16 April ceasefire, which had been due to expire on 17 May. Lebanese media published the draft of a purported ten-point “declaration of intent” that includes a mutual affirmation “of the right of each state to live in peace and security within its internationally recognised borders”, as well as commitments by Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and by Lebanon to exert full sovereignty over all its territory through its armed forces. Negotiations reportedly will proceed along a security track involving military delegations that will convene at the Pentagon on 29 May as well as a political track expected to resume in June. Despite the ceasefire extension, Israel continued deadly strikes on southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, while Hizbollah launched its own retaliatory drone attacks.
the view from Iran
Araghchi’s presence at the BRICS summit was designed to convey the message that Iran is not isolated, despite U.S. pressure. His meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and his praise for China’s potential role in ending the war, formed part of the same effort: to showcase the reach of Iran’s diplomatic networks. During the summit, he called on members to condemn U.S.-Israeli “aggression”. But the United Arab Emirates blocked consensus language, a move Araghchi attributed to Abu Dhabi’s economic and security partnership with Israel.
Araghchi had another purpose in acknowledging that the two sides had reached an impasse on the nuclear issue and that the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium abroad was currently “not on the agenda”: to underscore Tehran’s insistence on a sequential approach. Pursuant to this approach, a first phase would include an end to the U.S. naval blockade, an opening of the Strait of Hormuz (albeit under Iranian management) and a degree of sanctions relief. Only in a second phase would nuclear details be addressed. His reference to Russia’s offer to store Iran’s enriched uranium as something Tehran might “consider at an appropriate time” was also notable, as the wording left open the possibility that Iran could ship out its stockpile, albeit to a country with which it enjoys close ties and that could send the uranium back in the event that the Trump administration reneged on U.S. commitments.
Meanwhile, Iran has sought to further institutionalise its management of the Strait of Hormuz. The Revolutionary Guards redefined the strait as a “vast operational area” stretching from Jask to Siri islands; the Persian Gulf Strait Authority published vessel declaration requirements; and the authorities launched Hormuz Safe, a maritime insurance platform for vessels transiting the strait. All these measures point to an effort to turn a wartime contingency into what could be a permanent administrative regime. The passage of roughly 30 vessels, most bound for China, on the day before the Trump-Xi summit was consistent with this approach. Iranian state media described the transit as taking place “with Iran’s permission”. Iran’s aim was to preserve leverage while both limiting the economic cost of a full closure and assuaging Beijing, thereby reducing any chance that China might align with Trump’s efforts to reopen the strait. Tehran also announced that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has tapped Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the increasingly powerful parliamentary speaker, to be Iran’s special envoy to China, a move that signalled Iran’s desire to further pivot toward Beijing.
the view from the U.S.
President Trump’s statement on the return flight from Beijing that he would accept a twenty-year moratorium on Iranian enrichment, provided the guarantee was “real” suggested wiggle room – or at least high uncertainty – in his administration’s bottom-line negotiating position. So, too, did his acknowledgement that he was mainly trying for a public relations win when he insisted that Iran hand over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to the U.S. At a minimum, he was implicitly conceding that getting Iran to agree to permanent zero enrichment was unrealistic. It also tracked with earlier reports that U.S. negotiators had been working around a twelve- to fifteen-year moratorium in discussions of a possible memorandum of understanding with Iran. Together, these indicators suggest there might be room for compromise on the stockpile’s fate.
Still, despite his purported decision to hold off on a military attack, Trump’s on-and-off warnings and various press reports kept alive the very real possibility of renewed all-out warfare. On 15 May, The New York Times reported that the U.S. and Israel were intensifying preparations for military operations, including possible commando raids to seize Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and strikes on Kharg island, Iran’s main oil export hub.
The administration also faces a legal and political challenge. Its earlier announcement that hostilities had “terminated” and thus U.S. military operations were not subject to the legal restrictions of the War Powers Resolution, is difficult to square with the U.S. naval blockade as well as U.S. threats of further military escalation. In the most recent Senate vote to end the war with Iran, President Trump suffered an additional defection when Senator Lisa Murkowki, a Republican from Alaska, voted for a resolution that would have proscribed further hostilities without congressional authorisation.
The war’s unpopularity and growing unease even among congressional Republicans are only likely to increase should Trump choose to escalate militarily. Further efforts by the administration to circumvent the restrictions of the War Powers Resolution, such as by labelling a new operation Sledgehammer to distinguish it from Epic Fury and thus purporting to reset the Resolution’s 60-day clock for unauthorised military operations, are unlikely be either legally or politically persuasive. At the same time, given the long history of executive branch disregard for the Resolution’s constraints, which the Trump administration has disparaged as unconstitutional, it is not clear how much practical effect they will have here.
the view from Israel
Israel continued striking Lebanon during the bilateral talks with the Lebanese government that took place at the U.S. State Department, targeting what it described as Hizbollah infrastructure in the Bekaa Valley, Tibnin, Yater and Bint Jbeil on 14-15 May. The strikes went on even as Israeli envoys agreed to extend the ceasefire. Moreover, the 45-day extension announced on 16 May brought little respite; just a day later, Israel issued forced displacement orders for nine Lebanese villages and bombed five others. Hizbollah drone attacks on northern Israel also continued, wounding four civilians near Rosh Hanikra on 14 May. The death toll from ten weeks of fighting now stands at 2,998 Lebanese (600 since the ostensible ceasefire came into effect on 17 April) and 21 Israelis. The operational tempo reflects Israel’s persistent position that the ceasefire does not limit its right to strike what it considers or labels as active threats.
The ceasefire’s extension buys time but does not resolve Israel’s core concern: Hizbollah’s weapons remain in place, and the movement has publicly rejected disarmament as a subject for negotiation. Influential Israeli media commentators criticise the extension as submission to U.S. diktat.
Similarly, despite continued intense, arguably unprecedented military and intelligence coordination between the two sides, there does not appear to be perfect alignment between the Israeli and U.S. positions regarding negotiations with Iran, particularly with regard to whether the suspension of uranium enrichment should be permanent or could be time-limited.
the view from the Gulf
Tensions between Iran and the UAE continued to rise. The BRICS meeting made clear the extent to which the UAE is willing to use international forums to push back against Iran, as it has been doing since the start of the war. Abu Dhabi’s decision to block consensus language was notable insofar as it shielded the U.S. and Israel from condemnation of their actions in a non-Western multilateral institution. It came against the backdrop of Israel’s decision to publicise Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s heretofore secret trip to the UAE during the war – apparently the first such visit since the two countries normalised relations.
Though the UAE swiftly denied the visit had occurred, the report only confirmed Abu Dhabi’s dramatic strategic realignment in Iran’s eyes. The deterioration in relations between the two countries persisted on the military front as well: the UAE continues to absorb more Iranian missile and drone fire than any other Gulf state since 28 February and, in a notable escalation, the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant was hit on 18 May, causing a fire in the electrical generator though no injuries. Though the origin of the strikes was not confirmed, Emirati officials left no doubt about their conviction that it came from Iran or one of its partners.
In all this, the UAE stands out among GCC member states. In addition to these moves, its simultaneous withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ accelerates a broader recalibration that started before the war. That said, continued attacks, likely emanating from pro-Iranian groups in Iraq, on other Gulf Arab states – including on Saudi Arabia on the same day as Barakah was struck – could narrow the gap between them and the UAE. The six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan all strongly condemned the renewed attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, without naming Iran.
For now, Riyadh and Doha remain committed to a diplomatic course, intent as they are on finding a quick pathway to reopening the Strait of Hormuz and limiting the already huge economic costs of its closure. Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, whose energy exports have no pipeline alternatives to the strait, are the most exposed to a prolonged limbo of partial closure and stalled talks. The Saudi and Qatari foreign ministers held calls with Araghchi and their Pakistani counterparts, with the Qatari prime minister expected to visit Pakistan in its role as mediator. The Qatari prime minister also went to the U.S. in early May in support of Pakistan mediation efforts. As noted, Trump claimed that he was postponing resumed military action at the request of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.
outlook: dark clouds gathering
Trump’s remarks before and after the Beijing summit underscore the precarious nature of the ceasefire and the challenges that bedevil diplomacy. The deadlock in talks reflects the same misalignment as before: Washington, believing that it can force an outcome due to its military superiority, continues to insist on a deal that addresses the nuclear file up front and on its preferred terms; Tehran, convinced it is more resilient and enjoys greater short-term leverage, maintains that the first step should be to end the war, lift the blockade, open the strait under its authority and ensure a degree of economic relief, before substantive nuclear negotiations. As of now, neither side has given up on diplomacy; each side is seeking to build leverage for negotiations; and both are dropping inconsistent hints about possible areas of compromise.
Still, as long as Trump expects something akin to surrender, a return to full-scale war remains a real possibility – a prospect made more likely by reinforcements in the U.S. regional military posture. For its part, the Iranian leadership believes it can outlast the U.S. There is little reason to believe that it will concede under threat of renewed force what it has refused to concede after three months of bombing and a sustained naval blockade. Mojtaba Khamenei’s recent directives to the armed forces to preserve operational readiness, and the Revolutionary Guards’ continued insistence on Iran’s maritime reach and control, indicate that Tehran is preparing for the renewed war it expects rather than the agreement Washington is trying to compel.
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