Hassan Hassan
New Lines Magazine / September 27, 2024
Amid Israel’s conflict with Hamas and its allies, Damascus has taken a series of steady steps to mend ties with its former enemies.
In September last year, an event on the Syrian border signalled the possibility of Iranian-backed forces opening a new front against Israel in Syria — yet, in a surprising turn, that front has remained quiet for the past year during the war in Gaza. Israeli tanks responded to Syrian troop deployments by striking two military structures inside Syria. Israeli authorities claimed the structures had been built in a demilitarized border zone that was established by a 1974 agreement between the two countries.
This attack went largely unnoticed at the time, but in hindsight it is intriguing for two main reasons.
First, Israel did not respond in the same way to similar military reinforcements in 2011, when the Syrian military deployed troops, airplanes and tanks close to the Israeli border. At a 1974 summit in Geneva, the two countries agreed on a demilitarized “area of separation” along the border, and a further “area of limitation” within 25 kilometers in either direction, restricting military strength in the zone to small, lightly armed forces. The 2011 Syrian deployment, intended to quell a nascent uprising, encompassed locations within this area of limitation, including the towns of Nawa, Jasim and Enkhel.
Second, the front between Syria and Israel has remained mysteriously calm for the past year — despite the involvement of other Iranian allies in the conflict and Israel’s strikes and operations inside Syria, including an attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus and the assassination of a top Iranian commander on April 1. In contrast, the Houthis, from distant Yemen, unexpectedly joined the fight against Israel as part of Iran’s strategy to unify conflict zones across the region (a doctrine known in Arabic as “wahdat al-sahat” or “the unity of theaters”). Syria is the only member of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” to have so far stayed out of the conflict.
The underlying story behind this relative quiet is a process that the regime in Damascus has engaged in while the war in Gaza has continued, and which might help it emerge as one of the victors upon its conclusion. The regime has used the war to restore an older perception, established first by former President Hafez al-Assad, that it alone has the ability to keep Syria’s border with Israel quiet and secure. Rather than emerging as a new front for the Iranian axis, as many have long feared since the country descended into conflict in 2011, Syria is attempting to settle into its old role, while taking steps to gradually return to the regional fold through significant diplomatic and political overtures aimed at once more normalizing its position.
Commentary on Syria’s decision to stay out of the war in Gaza has often focused on one particular aspect of the situation, namely postwar Syria’s special vulnerability if it were to engage in a new regional conflict.
The potential consequences for the Syrian regime are far more unpredictable than those for Hezbollah and the Houthis, both from Israel and from the rebels in northern Syria if the country suffers attacks in the manner that Lebanon is facing today. In Lebanon, Hezbollah and Israel have been involved in a calculated cycle of escalations and responses for nearly two decades, following their own established rules of engagement. The Houthis, too, face fewer risks and have self-serving local motivations for involvement in the conflict, independent of the broader war, which are likely to continue even after the current war ends.
For Syria, the risks could be substantial and catastrophic if Israel escalates its attacks to include targeting Syria’s top leadership, rather than focusing solely on logistical hubs tied to Iran’s military buildup in the country. The rebels in the north could also take advantage in such a scenario, attacking regime areas after years of near quiet on the front lines, apart from frequent strikes in rebel areas.
Analysts have also noted the strained relationship between Damascus and Hamas, stemming from the latter’s support for the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime despite Damascus’ long-standing support for the group, though that argument is less convincing.
Additionally, even Iranian allies that have taken military action have been careful not to initiate a full-blown war, seeking to aid the Palestinians by raising the cost of a prolonged war in Gaza. As Ali Hashem reported for New Lines in January: “Tehran has previously promised to consolidate conflict zones to present a unified front against Israel. Decision makers within this network have attributed the failure to do so to unforeseen circumstances where they find themselves retaliating against Israeli and American strikes, while striving to keep their responses below the threshold of triggering full-scale escalation.”
While these forces are driven by local dynamics, their calculated involvement is equally shaped by the broader regional alliance led by Iran. This alliance is built on foundational narratives of confrontation against Israel, the West and their regional allies. The local and regional drivers often intersect, with Syria being a key part of this alliance. Even allied militias in Syria and Iraq have participated in this regional conflict — either within Iraq, targeting Israel through drones or the American forces inside the country, or in Syria’s northeast, beyond the regime’s control, against U.S.-backed Kurdish forces.
Hezbollah’s involvement in the war has caused significant damage to both the group and Lebanon, sparking an intense debate among its supporters about the viability of continued involvement and why Syria has been “allowed” to remain largely idle. Syria remains strategically crucial to Iran’s broader escalation against Israel, and Iran itself has suffered some of its heaviest losses there, including the targeting of key assets and the deaths of field commanders.
More notably, Syria hasn’t merely avoided confrontation with Israel; its silence has been conspicuous. The regime has also softened its rhetoric during the conflict, refraining from issuing the usual statements of support to Hezbollah or Iran after major attacks. As some Syrians have noted on social media, Syrian television continued broadcasting songs and normal programming following Israel’s attacks, including after the killing of top Hezbollah leaders.
Meanwhile, social media accounts linked to President Bashar al-Assad have focused on domestic issues like a government reshuffle and general amnesty. When Damascus did issue a statement after the heightened Israeli attacks in Lebanon recently, it expressed solidarity with Lebanon without mentioning Hezbollah or the usual strong endorsement of the Axis of Resistance. Previous muted statements about Gaza were explained as a reflection of Damascus’ stance against the “traitor” Hamas: The official statement condemning the assassination of Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh in July focused on condemning the Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty, with a passing mention of Haniyeh.
This dynamic is unusual and cannot be dismissed as mere paralysis. It is easy to imagine an alternative scenario in which pro-Iranian or Syrian actors might carry out symbolic, limited attacks from the Golan Heights to signal solidarity with the Palestinians. The complete absence of such actions suggests that Iran is respecting Syria’s strategy of staying out of the conflict entirely, likely upon Damascus’ request and with the support of its ally in Moscow. This may also explain the silence of Iranian allies, who have refrained from calling on Syria to participate, especially given that Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has consistently affirmed Syria’s position within the Axis of Resistance, despite efforts by regional and international powers to “neutralize” it.
Iran is likely only tolerating such a stance, and would rather have Syria involved if it had its way. Yet Tehran has few choices if both Damascus and Moscow disagree with it. Though dynamics and calculations could still change rapidly, the “unity of theaters” strategy is today missing a uniquely positioned piece, Syria, at a key moment for the Iran-led axis.
To gain a clearer understanding of the current dynamic, I spoke with several well-placed sources and analysts familiar with the inner workings of Damascus and Tehran, including a relative of a high-ranking officer in Syrian intelligence with close ties to Assad. The consensus among these sources is that Syria’s strategy intentionally involves staying out of the war and maintaining calm along the Israeli border — and, crucially, making a point of visibly doing so. Another key insight is that Damascus has little concern about seeing both Hezbollah and Iran contained, even though both allies currently support Syria’s position publicly. This is acceptable to the regime as long as it does not embolden the rebels within Syria or tip the regional balance against it, which appears unlikely at present.
This dynamic is not surprising. Even at the height of the Syrian war, many Alawite Syrians loyal to the regime were uncomfortable with the growing influence of non-Syrian commanders. For them, this discomfort often stemmed from a sense of pride in having built the military and security institutions of modern Syria, only to find themselves answering to “bearded” Hezbollah and Iranian commanders.
Iran has invested heavily in establishing a foothold in Syria since the war started. It has done so by building militias and networks from the ground up, reporting directly to it rather than to the Syrian military. It has used Syria as a hub to transfer weapons to Hezbollah and to build military facilities, ammunition depots and command centers in the country. To prevent the creation of another Hezbollah-style threat in Syria, Israel has played a relentless game of whack-a-mole against Iranian assets in the country for years. Though no Syrian close to the regime would be willing to be quoted as saying it, for many, while Israel is an enemy and its attacks inside Syria are unacceptable, the results are nonetheless not always unwelcome.
As friends in Damascus told me, they have not felt a blast rocking Damascus since the Iranian Consulate attack on April 1. Before then, Israeli strikes targeting the Damascus airport were frequent, arriving more than once a day at one point. The Israelis reportedly intercept Iranian transfers moving through the airport. The absence of attacks could either mean that Iran has stopped using it as a transfer hub, or, less likely, that Israel stopped attacking the Syrian capital of its own volition. Most recent attacks have taken place in rural or remote areas away from the capital. Again, this situation could change, but the trend in Damascus since April is notable even to ordinary people there.
Parallel to this dynamic with regard to the war with Israel, and along the same lines, the Assad regime has undertaken a series of overtures aimed at the Gulf states and Turkey, signalling that it can be a pragmatic “frenemy,” even if it does not fully sever its ties to the Iranian axis.
The most eye-catching of these moves was the expulsion of the Houthi representatives from Damascus and the closure of the Yemeni Embassy, just days after the war in Gaza broke out. The Syrian regime had handed over control of the embassy to the Houthis in 2015, shortly after the war in Yemen began. At the time, Houthi official Khaled Arrasi commented: “The [Syrian] decision to close down the embassy is not an easy or simple decision. It is a disaster, because it means we have failed on the diplomatic level.” More significantly, on Oct. 11, the embassy was handed over to the Saudi-backed government in Yemen.
Curiously, on Oct. 8, just three days before the embassy’s transfer and a day after the Hamas operation in Israel, Assad held a phone call with the United Arab Emirates’ president, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Sheikh Mohammed, who also spoke to counterparts in Israel, Egypt and Jordan on the same day, reportedly passed on messages warning Assad not to get involved in the fight and not to allow his country to be a launchpad for attacks against Israel.
In late January, the UAE appointed an ambassador to Damascus, following the restoration of diplomatic ties and the reopening of its embassy in December 2018. Saudi Arabia has already made a series of remarkable gestures following its warm reception of Assad at the Arab Summit in May 2023 and readmitting Syria to the Arab League: In early January of this year, it returned the responsibility of regulating pilgrimages for Syrians to the Syrian government, 10 years after it had been transferred to the opposition following the embassy’s closure in 2013; in May, Riyadh appointed an ambassador in Damascus, for the first time in a decade; and on Sept. 9, it reopened its own embassy in Damascus, where diplomats and notables celebrated Saudi Arabia’s national day on Sept. 23. Now all Gulf countries except Qatar have restored diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime.
Turkey, one of the few remaining countries without formal ties to Damascus, has also begun steps toward normalizing relations with Assad. Both the Syrian and Turkish presidents have made clear statements expressing a desire to restore relations, though no significant progress has yet been made. In July, the Turkish president said he would extend an invite to his Syrian counterpart “any time” to visit Turkey and mend ties. In a speech to the Syrian parliament in August, Assad addressed his domestic audience, explaining the rationale for reengaging with Turkey despite its leading role in efforts to topple his regime. Notably, he indicated that engagement with Turkey was not contingent on preconditions like a Turkish pledge to withdraw from Syria — an unusually flexible stance in the regime’s public discourse.
The Gulf and Turkish efforts to normalize relations with Assad each follow their own logic. For Turkey, rapprochement with Damascus has long been hinted at first as a way to counter U.S.-backed Kurdish influence in northern and northeastern Syria, in line with Ankara’s alliance with Moscow since 2016; and more recently because the presence of Syrian refugees has become a political liability for Erdogan, with far-right nationalist groups using the issue to criticize him.
For Saudi Arabia, engaging with Syria serves both broad and specific purposes. Broadly, it aligns with Riyadh’s new strategy of healing rifts with estranged neighbours and reducing its involvement in regional conflicts. More specifically, Saudi Arabia hopes that reengaging Syria could help curb the growing drug trafficking trade that has become a major concern for the region. For the UAE, the rapprochement is part of a broader effort to return to the pre-Arab Spring status quo, viewing a strengthened Assad regime as a stabilizing force in Syria and a counterweight to Islamist movements.
A meaningful Syrian involvement in the war in Gaza could have disrupted this potentially game-changing opening for the regime.
Assad’s silence, regardless of the drivers behind it, is rebuilding goodwill among some of his former adversaries, particularly in the Gulf, and potentially even in Israel and the United States. It could revive an older perception of Syria, one that predates the 2011 uprising and civil war: the belief that the Assad regime would prioritize keeping the Golan front quiet. Since the Syrian conflict broke out, developments along the Israeli border have been a major concern for Israel and in Western policy circles. The fear of a potential Iranian buildup in Syria, akin to that which Tehran has achieved in Iraq, has driven Western efforts to cooperate with regime rivals and establish footholds in the country. The war in Gaza, therefore, serves as the first major test of Syria’s stance on maintaining calm along the Golan while balancing its ties with Iran.
But the biggest prize is not the perception that the Assad regime is maintaining peace on its border with Israel, it is regional normalization. Assad’s approach signals that while he remains a close strategic ally of Iran, he is capable of charting an independent course when it serves his regime’s interests. Gulf policymakers, once hopeful of pulling Damascus away from Tehran, now hold fewer illusions than they did in 2011. Much like their approach to Iraq, they seem increasingly willing to accept a complicated relationship with an Iran-allied Syria.
In the mind of the Assad regime, if the Gulf states and Turkey return to Syria, Europe will follow. The best that Assad could hope from Washington is to somehow prevent it from actively blocking such efforts by enforcing sanctions or discouraging its allies from engaging or investing in Syria, for example. Should the Assad regime be rehabilitated, even cautiously or in limited ways, the calm on the Golan Heights and the pragmatic steps he has taken over the past year while Gaza burns could be remembered as key factors in rebuilding diplomatic ties in the region, and softening opposition from Israel and the West.
Hassan Hassan is founder and editor in chief of New Lines magazine
