Ragip Soylu
Middle East Eye / September 1, 2026
Turkish troops deployed to Deir ez-Zor and built a temporary bridge across the Euphrates, drawing no military response from Israel.
Istanbul – Two weeks after Israel bombed a Syrian base in the north to draw a red line against Turkish troops moving south, Ankara did exactly that, with no military response from Israel.
Over the weekend, the Turkish army moved into Deir ez-Zor to establish a temporary bridge for civilians crossing the Euphrates River. Turkish soldiers, working alongside their Syrian counterparts, quickly erected the floating bridge, raised Turkish and Syrian flags, and tested the platform by driving Turkish armoured vehicles across it.
Turkish drones were hovering overhead to provide an additional layer of security for the troops, according to sources speaking to Middle East Eye.
“We will not tolerate Turkish military entrenchment moving southward because it threatens us,” Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last month after ordering strikes on the Abu al-Duhur military airbase in northern Syria, approximately 70km from the Turkish border.
Israeli officials claimed that Turkey was preparing to move into the base, an assertion denied by Turkish and Syrian officials, as well as US envoy Tom Barrack.
Netanyahu’s spokesperson said: “Israel wouldn’t allow Turkey to entrench itself in Syria and to move steadily south toward Israel’s border.”
Turkish officials view the lack of an Israeli response to the Turkish army’s movement deep into southern Syria, nearly 180km from the Turkish border, as evidence that Netanyahu had sought to inflame tensions to score political points ahead of Israel’s critical general election in October.
Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), believes Israel is now under greater pressure to exercise restraint towards Turkey.
“Washington has been very clear that it wants to prevent an Israeli-Turkish escalation in Syria and is actively working on a deconfliction mechanism among Israel, Turkey and Syria,” she told MEE.
“That probably creates an additional incentive for Israel to distinguish between developments that it considers genuinely threatening and Turkish activity that it can tolerate.”
Valensi said that if Israeli statements about Turkish forces moving towards the Israeli border are taken literally, there is indeed a contradiction.
“This case suggests that ‘moving south’ is not, by itself, the real red line. In practice, Israel seems more concerned with permanent Turkish military capabilities that could limit its freedom of action,” she said. “So the public rhetoric may have been broader than the actual operational threshold.”
Israel’s red line
Despite Israel’s red-line rhetoric, Valensi said the country is more interested in preventing the deployment of Turkish air-defence systems, radar, and command-and-control capabilities, as well as the transfer of advanced weapons into Syria.
“In fact, the Deir ez-Zor case may actually demonstrate that Israel’s red line is less about how far south Turkey goes and more about what Turkey brings with it; engineers and bridges are one thing; air-defence systems, permanent bases and strategic capabilities are another.”
Some Israeli reports suggested that Israel was deeply concerned about the possible deployment of air-defence systems at the Abu al-Duhur military airbase. Such systems could allow Ankara to track Israeli Air Force movements over Syria during military operations targeting Iran.
However, a new INSS report on the issue makes clear that such a deployment would not substantially affect Israel’s “freedom of action” in Syrian airspace.
“From an operational standpoint, there is little practical difference between the deployment of Turkish radar, electronic warfare or air-defence systems in northern Syria and their deployment in southern Turkey or northern Cyprus,” the INSS report said.
“Their coverage ranges are similar, and the presence of such systems in northern Syria therefore does not in itself constitute a red line warranting the use of Israeli force.
“The same applies to the maritime domain: The Turkish navy enjoys an inherent advantage in the eastern Mediterranean, and a limited presence along the Syrian coast would not fundamentally alter the balance of power.”
Ragip Soylu is Middle East Eye’s Turkey Bureau Chief, based in Ankara
