Giorgio Cafiero
The New Arab / August 7, 2026
The real test of the Hormuz deal is whether it can turn a tactical compromise into a durable diplomatic opening between the US and Iran.
The framework agreement reached between Oman and Iran to temporarily reopen the Strait of Hormuz could mark a very meaningful diplomatic breakthrough.
By establishing a mechanism for commercial vessels to transit the waterway through separate Iranian- and Omani-managed shipping lanes, the proposal offers a potential pathway to restoring maritime traffic through a critical chokepoint that carries around a fifth of globally traded oil.
The significance of the arrangement extends well beyond shipping. But whether it is ever fully implemented, let alone successful, will largely depend on the trajectory of US-Iran relations.
A diplomatic breakthrough with major political obstacles
Under this framework, commercial vessels would enter the Gulf through a northern shipping lane managed by Iran and exit via a southern route overseen by Oman, replacing months of uncertainty with a coordinated albeit temporary traffic management system.
Iranian officials say the agreement does not include transit tolls. This is a notable concession given Tehran’s previous calls to charge vessels for safe passage.
The arrangement receives the backing of Oman’s fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and is expected to involve the International Maritime Organisation in its formal rollout.
Yet, Washington has insisted it will only support a deal that preserves unrestricted passage through the waterway. That leaves key operational and political questions unresolved, including how the routes will be managed in practice and whether the agreement can survive the wider confrontation between the US-Israeli alliance and the Islamic Republic.
The arrangement is a “breakthrough in process rather than a completed breakthrough in substance,” explained Dr Abdullah Baabood, an Omani scholar and visiting professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, in an interview with The New Arab.
While agreeing on shipping routes represents an important diplomatic and technical milestone after months of confrontation, he argues that the harder questions remain unresolved. These are about who authorises vessel movements, how security responsibilities will be shared, whether any inspection regime will exist, and what happens if US-Iran tensions flare again.
Offering a similar assessment, Dr Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group (ICG), credited the agreement with being a “meaningful but narrow breakthrough” while calling it “a bridge, not a destination”.
In his view, replacing unilateral action with an agreed mechanism for managing maritime traffic creates the first practical basis for restoring commercial shipping. But it cannot by itself reopen the Strait of Hormuz or establish a durable security order.
The agreement reflects Tehran’s considerable leverage. “It has become clear that Iran possesses considerable leverage. Geography gives Iran the capacity to threaten, delay or complicate navigation through mines, missiles, drones, inspections, and pressure on shipping companies,” stated Dr Baabood.
“Because the Strait previously carried around one-fifth of internationally traded oil and gas, even a limited threat can affect insurance, freight costs and energy prices,” he added.
Dr Vaez holds that Tehran’s strongest bargaining power lies not in permanently obstructing navigation but in making an orderly reopening contingent on broader US concessions, including sanctions relief and fulfilment of previous understandings.
Dr Rouzbeh Parsi, an affiliated researcher at Lund University, argues that Iran recognises the international economy is ultimately more dependent on uninterrupted passage through Hormuz than Iran itself.
For that reason, he contends, Tehran is unlikely to settle for a narrow maritime arrangement without securing more durable political and economic commitments from Washington.
Yet Tehran’s leverage has its own limits.
“First, it cannot indefinitely disrupt shipping without damaging its own economy, exports and regional relationships. Second, Gulf producers have pipelines and export facilities outside Hormuz, although these cannot fully replace the Strait,” Dr Baabood told The New Arab.
“Third, prolonged obstruction could generate stronger international military, diplomatic, and legal opposition. Finally, Iran cannot easily convert its capacity to cause insecurity into internationally recognised sovereignty over an international waterway.”
Markets will demand proof, not promises
The agreement could have important consequences for global energy markets. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz would allow delayed tankers to resume their voyages, ease pressure on shipping capacity, and gradually reduce freight costs and war-risk insurance premiums.
But one should caution against expecting an immediate return to normality.
Markets will distinguish between a political announcement and evidence that vessels can transit the waterway safely and consistently.
“Markets have already responded cautiously to diplomatic signals, but insurers and traders will require evidence: regular vessel movements, freedom from attacks, clearly published procedures, mine clearance, and credible guarantees that the arrangement will survive political disagreements,” said Dr Baabood.
Dr Vaez likewise says traders and insurers will price the durability of the arrangement rather than the diplomacy surrounding it, while Dr Parsi believes markets will remain “skittish” unless the wider confrontation between Washington and Tehran is resolved.
Even if Hormuz reopens, continued regional instability and the vulnerability of Gulf energy exports mean the strategic risk premium is unlikely to disappear overnight.
The real test lies in US-Iran relations
Ultimately, what is most significant about the Oman-Iran agreement is its potential to revive diplomacy between the United States and Iran. Rather than representing an end in itself, the maritime arrangement could serve as a confidence-building measure that creates political space for renewed negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program and a broader de-escalation of tensions.
But this process will not be automatic. Substantive talks would require a sustained halt to military operations alongside agreement on sanctions relief, nuclear inspections, and verification mechanisms. Reopening Hormuz cannot substitute for reciprocal steps on sanctions, frozen assets, and maritime trade.
Tehran will only embrace a lasting settlement if it receives verifiable guarantees that extend beyond a temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. In that sense, the agreement must not be understood as a resolution of the regional crisis. Instead, it is an early test or whether the two adversaries are prepared to negotiate a more durable political accommodation.
“As long as Tehran has the impression that Trump only wants the straits opened and then leave, there is no reason for them to help him out. Iran needs a durable peace, not a temporary armistice, and it needs to get its economy going after the devastating destruction that Israel and the US wreaked on the country. Actual lifting of sanctions and the economic windfall that can follow requires real verifiable commitments by the US,” Dr Parsi told The New Arab.
“And Tehran, rightly, believes itself to be in the position to demand them since it did not lose the war. I don’t think it necessarily won – but then neither did the instigators of the conflict,” he added.
For now, the Oman-Iran framework should be viewed more as an opportunity than an achievement. It offers a mechanism to restore commercial shipping through one of the world’s most strategically important waterways and creates a rare opening for diplomacy after months of military escalation.
However, its long-term viability rests on factors well beyond maritime coordination. Without a broader understanding between Washington and Tehran – one that addresses sanctions, regional security, and the nuclear file – the agreement might end up becoming a temporary crisis-management tool.
The future of the Strait of Hormuz, therefore, will be decided not only by the ships that pass through it, but by whether its principal antagonists are prepared to convert a fragile maritime compromise into a more durable political settlement.
“My overall assessment is that this could become a pilot project for cooperative Gulf security, but only if it survives the immediate crisis. Otherwise, it will remain a temporary traffic-management arrangement dependent on the fluctuating relationship between Tehran and Washington,” Dr Baabood told The New Arab.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
