Giorgio Cafiero
The New Arab / July 27, 2026
A historic US-Saudi nuclear deal appeared all but done – until Trump added a new condition: normalise relations with Israel.
For a moment, it looked like the United States and Saudi Arabia had finally reached a historic nuclear breakthrough.
After years of negotiations, Washington and Riyadh unveiled a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on 22 July. This landmark agreement appeared to give both sides what they wanted: American influence over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions and a pathway for the Kingdom to expand its energy program.
But just a day later, US President Donald Trump cast the agreement into serious doubt by introducing a new condition that Saudi Arabia normalise diplomatic relations with Israel.
For Riyadh, however, this remains a non-starter absent irreversible progress on the Palestinian issue.
The abrupt reversal underscored Trump’s unpredictability and his tendency to suddenly and drastically change course without warning, reinforcing a growing perception among Washington’s allies and partners that the United States is increasingly unreliable.
Why Riyadh and Washington wanted the deal
US negotiations over Saudi Arabia’s ambition to develop a civilian nuclear industry date back to George W. Bush’s presidency, when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in civilian nuclear energy in 2008.
Four years later, during Barack Obama’s presidency, Washington and Riyadh began formal negotiations over a “123 Agreement” under the US Atomic Energy Act.
Those talks, however, stalled over non-proliferation concerns, particularly US demands that Saudi Arabia accept restrictions on uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
During Trump’s first term (2017–21), the US renewed and intensified its pursuit of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. They continued under Joe Biden, albeit as part of a broader regional diplomatic initiative linking US-Saudi security commitments, potential Saudi-Israeli normalisation, and US support for Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear ambitions.
For Riyadh, nuclear energy has long been central to its vision for economic diversification beyond oil. Washington, meanwhile, has interests in ensuring that any Saudi nuclear program remains anchored in the Western orbit rather than falling under Chinese or Russian influence.
At a time when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states are, to varying degrees, conducting increasingly multipolar foreign policies and deepening cooperation with Beijing and Moscow, the Trump administration, like its predecessor, seeks to curb Chinese and Russian influence in the Gulf and the wider Arab world.
For Riyadh, American cooperation on civilian nuclear development constituted a significant geopolitical prize, conferring access to cutting-edge technology and greater international legitimacy. For the United States, the agreement offered a means of steering the Kingdom’s nuclear future rather than allowing Beijing or Moscow to occupy that space.
“The agreement is an important strategic step in the US-Saudi relationship. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s legitimate ambition to develop peaceful nuclear energy as part of its economic transformation, growing energy needs, and long-term industrial plans,” said Mohammed Alhamed, a Saudi geopolitical analyst and president of Saudi Elite Group (a Riyadh-based public relations and marketing consultancy), in an interview with The New Arab.
“For Washington, it is also a practical decision. Saudi Arabia has several international options, and the United States does not want China or Russia to become the Kingdom’s main partners in such a sensitive and strategically important sector. The agreement strengthens trust and serves the national interests of both countries,” he added.
Trump’s Abraham Accords calculation
The agreement’s rollout was almost immediately overshadowed by reports of misalignment between the White House and the Department of Energy, led by Secretary Chris Wright, particularly regarding the timing and terms of the announcement.
Trump’s subsequent insistence that Riyadh normalise relations with Israel reportedly caught negotiators off guard, rendering an already contentious agreement even more politically sensitive.
The episode was classic Trump in terms of his eagerness to leverage a major diplomatic breakthrough in pursuit of broader foreign policy objectives – in this case, expanding the scope of the Abraham Accords.
Since his first term, Trump has made advancing the Abraham Accords a central objective of his Middle East policy. Widely regarded as the signature foreign policy achievement of his first presidency, the accords remain a legacy he is determined to build upon before leaving office, notwithstanding the formidable obstacles posed by the region’s current conflicts, particularly the Gaza genocide.
Yet Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that it will not normalise relations with Israel absent meaningful and irreversible progress toward Palestinian statehood. Against that backdrop, any expectation that Washington could leverage the civilian nuclear agreement to draw Riyadh into the Abraham Accords appears fundamentally unrealistic.
Initial Israeli concerns
The announcement of the deal, made before Trump conditioned it on Saudi-Israeli normalisation, prompted many commentators to warn that the agreement could undermine Israeli interests.
Writing in Haaretz, the Israeli nuclear proliferation expert Dr Or Rabinowitz described the deal as a “major strategic failure,” reminding readers that “for decades, Israel has had a clear strategic objective to prevent, or at least delay, the spread of civilian nuclear technology throughout the Middle East, particularly to neighbouring states”.
With tensions between Tel Aviv and Riyadh having steadily intensified since 7 October 2023 – and even more so following Israel’s act of international aggression against Qatar last year – the Israeli government has little appetite for any scenario that could place Saudi Arabia, or indeed any other regional state, on a pathway toward acquiring nuclear weapons.
As the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed state, Israel has vested interests in preserving its nuclear weapons monopoly in the region and would strongly resist any shift in the balance of power that might emerge were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, or another Middle Eastern power to acquire nuclear weapons.
“I would say that the US-Saudi nuclear agreement introduces notes of confusion and mistrust into the US-Israel relationship. I believe Trump was made aware of this either through his foreign policy advisors or contact from the Israeli government, after which he introduced the ex post facto condition of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, essentially a non-starter for Riyadh without progress on Palestinian issues,” explained Charles Dunne, a former US diplomat who served in Cairo and Jerusalem, in an interview with The New Arab.
“This has called into question whether the agreement, which in any case has a long lead-time before it is fully implemented, can be implemented at all. In the meantime, relations with Israel have become somewhat more fraught, and the Saudis are likely to become more distrustful of the United States,” he added.
The United States has its own strategic imperatives, and its relationship with Saudi Arabia cannot be shaped solely through the lens of Israeli interests, argued Alhamed. “Saudi Arabia is a major regional and global partner, and Washington has clear economic, security, and geopolitical reasons to deepen that relationship,” he told The New Arab.
“President Trump may try to connect the agreement politically to the Abraham Accords, but Saudi normalisation with Israel remains a separate issue. The Saudi position has been clear: any future normalisation must include meaningful progress toward Palestinian rights and a credible two-state solution. Saudi Arabia may have an interest in relations with Israel, but any decision will be made on Saudi terms,” noted the Saudi geopolitical analyst.
Non-proliferation factors
Beyond the diplomatic dynamics shaping the triangular relationship among the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, the nuclear agreement has also attracted non-proliferation concerns.
Critics argue that allowing Riyadh to enrich uranium domestically could create a pathway to the eventual militarisation of its nuclear program unless robust safeguards are firmly in place. Much of the discussion has centred on the Kingdom’s reluctance to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which grants inspectors expanded verification powers.
“In general, I believe the nuclear deal with the Saudis is unwise and compromises overall US goals about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” Dunne told The New Arab. Noting that Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has clearly stated Riyadh’s willingness to develop a nuclear weapon if Iran does so, the former US diplomat warned that this agreement seems to be a step in that direction.
“There is nothing specific in the deal, which, of course, has not yet been publicly released, to stop the Kingdom from building a nuclear deterrent in advance of any prospective Iranian weapon. If the United States is truly interested in non-proliferation in the region, it shouldn’t be helping a major power build a technical capacity that it does not technically need except for reasons of prestige and power,” added Dunne.
The agreement’s unveiling has also exposed divisions within Washington over how best to reconcile strategic imperatives with longstanding non-proliferation principles.
Some lawmakers argue that any civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia must be conditioned on stringent limits to uranium enrichment and robust verification measures.
Others contend that close nuclear cooperation is essential to prevent Riyadh from turning to China or Russia for comparable assistance. This debate, which largely plays out along partisan lines, is likely to endure, reflecting a persistent divide over the appropriate balance between geopolitical competition and non-proliferation objectives.
For the Trump administration, however, the agreement serves the broader strategic purpose of using civilian nuclear cooperation as a vehicle to draw Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords while creating lucrative commercial opportunities for American firms poised to benefit from decades of nuclear collaboration with the Kingdom.
The uncertain path
The episode ultimately highlights the deeper contradictions at the heart of Trump’s Middle East policy. Although the White House seeks to project American influence in the Middle East, the administration repeatedly undermines the credibility needed to sustain it.
By attaching an unexpected political condition to a landmark nuclear agreement, Trump once again demonstrated the unpredictability that has defined his approach to diplomacy, leaving friends and foes uncertain about whether deals with Washington can endure.
If the United States hopes to retain its influence in the region, it will need a more consistent and balanced strategy, recognising that diplomacy with important and influential Arab countries can’t be treated primarily as a vehicle for advancing Israeli objectives.
“Ultimately, this agreement reflects a simple reality: both Riyadh and Washington benefit from a stronger long-term partnership, and neither country should allow the interests of a third party to define that relationship,” explained Alhamed.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
