Tamer Ajrami
Middle East Monitor / May 17, 2026
When military power fails to impose “deterrence,” oil becomes politics. And the Strait of Hormuz is now writing Gulf security rules instead of the Pentagon.
With Hormuz still closed and the emergency oil stock releases used to calm markets running down, prices are moving _ no matter how much some people deny it _ toward a new surge. The real problem is not the price as a number. It is the chain reaction: gasoline and diesel, shipping and insurance, raw materials, and then inflation that travels from Asia to the United States. And even if the strait opened tomorrow, the damage would not vanish. Supply chains do not reset overnight, and parts of the oil and petrochemicals flow would take time to recover.
In my previous Middle East Monitor article [see below], I said clearly that Gulf states “have nothing but to talk to Iran now”. That was not idealism or goodwill. It was hard security math: the old formula is eroding. Bases do not protect the way people assumed, and guarantees shrink the moment they face a real test. Today, this is no longer an argument. It is a reality driven by markets before politics.
Trump and China: a visit without a lifeline – and time is against him
Trump’s attempt to turn to China produced no clear exit. Not because Beijing is powerless, but because it sees the issue in simple terms: open the strait through practical understandings, and negotiate with Iran on realistic terms.
The problem is that Washington still wants a “surrender” wrapped in diplomatic language. Iran sees no reason to give that for free as it holds leverage in a global energy shock.
This is the core of Trump’s trap: he can say whatever he wants, but he cannot cancel economics. Markets do not negotiate. They punish.
That is why countries are now moving on two tracks: a unilateral track to protect their own interests, and a collective track to design a new framework that prevents the next shock. Saudi Arabia is stepping forward to lead the collective track, not because it loves “mediation” as a headline, but because the cost of ongoing chaos has become higher than the cost of a deal.
A new ‘Helsinki Act’ – but without the human rights basket
According to Western reporting, Saudi Arabia is floating something close to a “Gulf Helsinki Act” arrangement with Iran—modelled on the Helsinki process of the mid-1970s during the Cold War. It would not be just a Saudi–Iran deal. It would extend to the Gulf and the European Union, aiming to lock in non-aggression, structured economic normalization, and monitoring and implementation mechanisms.
The original Helsinki process was built around four “baskets”: security and non-aggression; economic cooperation; human rights and self-determination; and follow-up mechanisms. In the Middle East, copying the third basket is unrealistic. The region’s unwritten rule is non-interference. Here, states do not use “human rights” language as a tool to destabilize each other internally. So, the Saudi approach seems to focus on three practical baskets: security and non-aggression, economic cooperation and stable energy flows, and verification/implementation.
It is a practical logic: if you want an agreement that can survive, you do not plant a delayed bomb inside it.
The hard question: can a deal work without the United States ?
Here is the central dilemma. A Gulf–EU–Iran non-aggression arrangement without the United States creates a dangerous gap: the Gulf and Europe commit to non-aggression, Iran commits too, but Washington and Israel still retain the ability to strike Iran. What does the agreement do then? Does it become a nice document that collapses at the first air raid?
On the other hand, bringing Washington into the deal is not easy either. The US is struggling to produce a quick bilateral agreement with Iran to end the crisis, so why would it accept a broader framework that limits its freedom of action?
This opens a third, more sensitive option: Gulf states and Europe “bypass Washington” in practice. That would mean refusing the use of their airspace and territorial waters for any military or intelligence activity against Iran. And maybe refusing to enforce sanctions that destabilize the region and recreate the Hormuz shock. This is not a small move. It would be a strategic shift.
The UAE: a different vision – and a dangerous ceiling
The Gulf is not unified on strategy. Other reporting suggests Emirati efforts to push a coordinated Gulf military “response” against Iran. The problem is not the idea of response by itself. The problem is the ceiling of objectives.
If the goal is limited deterrence to reduce escalation, that is one thing. But if the goal mirrors Netanyahu and Washington _ regime change, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, destroying its ballistic capabilities, and reshaping Iran from the inside _ that is a long war. And the Gulf does not have the luxury to absorb its costs.
Most importantly, the idea of “escaping Hormuz” through alternative pipelines is not a real solution. If peace collapses, fields, ports, and energy infrastructure across the region remain within range. And Bab al-Mandab can become another choke point. In the end, the issue is not a pipeline or a port. It is a sustainable peace that prevents the drone and the missile before it “manages” the price.
Whoever ends the war ends the chaos
A way out starts from one point: ending the US–Israeli confrontation with Iran through a realistic understanding; then building a regional framework similar to “Helsinki” that locks in non-aggression, protects economies, and prevents a repeat of the strait crisis.
Saudi Arabia is trying to “hold the story together” because Washington entered, got stuck, and now wants to exit; while the Gulf cannot afford to sit between Iran’s leverage and America’s disorder.
The choice is clearer than ever: either a settlement that closes the door on choke-point warfare, or a longer crisis that bankrupts markets before it bankrupts armies. The Gulf; whether it likes it or not; no longer has the option to “wait”.
Tamer Ajrami is a student of political science living in Belgium
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Gulf States have nothing but to talk to Iran, now
Tamer Ajrami
Middle East Monitor / May 11, 2026
Here is what Washington missed: the Gulf is not a chessboard where outside powers can “manage escalation” and still keep business as usual. The Gulf is a narrow geography with one choke point, one energy artery, and one unavoidable neighbour with leverage. When the Strait of Hormuz becomes the battleground, or even the bargaining chip, every Gulf capital eventually faces the same conclusion: you either build a working arrangement with Iran, or you live inside a permanent crisis.
The US bases did not ‘solve’ Gulf security – now they expose it
For decades, the security bargain was simple: Gulf states host US forces, and the US deters threats. But deterrence is only real if it protects the host countries and the forces themselves. Recent reporting suggests the opposite: major US sites in the region were damaged more than publicly acknowledged, with a Washington Post satellite-imagery review cited as documenting damage to hundreds of structures and equipment across multiple bases.
Even if you debate the exact numbers, the strategic lesson is harder to debate: fixed bases are not a magic shield. They are known addresses. And when conflict expands they can become liabilities, politically and operationally. And once the public sees that these bases cannot reliably prevent disruption of the Gulf’s most critical lifeline (the Strait), the old security story starts to collapse.
Iran is already acting like a ‘gatekeeper’ with a new transit mechanism
The biggest shift is not rhetorical. It’s procedural.
According to reporting that cites Iran’s state media, vessels transiting Hormuz have reportedly been receiving messages linked to a newly referenced “Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA)” with stated “transit regulations” and a permit-like framework.
Call it what you want, bureaucratic theater, leverage signalling, or an attempt at control; the implication is serious: Iran is trying to normalize the idea that passage is not just an international routine, but something that can be administered.
For Gulf states, this matters more than American messaging. Because if a new “mechanism” becomes accepted in practice _ even informally _ it will shape shipping behaviour, insurance pricing, and investor confidence. The Gulf economies run on predictability. Anything that turns transit into “permission” creates political risk as a permanent cost.
Gulf geography is a strategic cage, not a policy choice
Gulf states are “besieged” by geography in the most literal sense:
The picture is like this: one narrow exit for energy exports and essential imports, dense infrastructure near coastlines, short flight times for missiles and drones, and no realistic way to “move the Gulf” or “re-route the Strait” at scale, at least not quickly.
So, when Washington talks about “options”, Gulf capitals should translate that into one word: exposure. The Gulf cannot afford a long game of pressure and counter-pressure, because time itself becomes the weapon: every week of disruption raises costs, increases uncertainty, and punishes the very economies the Gulf has spent decades trying to diversify.
The market is already heating up: through insurance, shipping, and supply chains
Even without a full closure, the risk of closure functions like a tax on the global economy. Shipping markets don’t wait for official announcements; they are priced fear.
Recent coverage has described how war-risk insurance and shipping costs can jump when Hormuz is threatened, and how this risk spills into global supply chains. That does not only hit “the West”. It hits Gulf ports, Gulf logistics, Gulf sovereign wealth plans, and Gulf diversification targets.
And while external powers may deploy naval assets to “signal presence” that does not automatically restore confidence. Even reports of naval movements, like the widely covered positioning of a French aircraft carrier group toward the Red Sea region, mainly underline the fact that the wider theater is heating up and not cooling down.
The clear truth: Gulf states need a regional deal, not a foreign umbrella
This is not a call to “trust Iran”. It is a call to recognize reality.
The core interest of Gulf states is not winning narratives; it is preventing the Strait from becoming a permanent bargaining chip. That requires direct channels and a working framework with Iran. Simply, because no outside actor can guarantee the Strait in a prolonged confrontation without dragging the entire region into open-ended escalation.
Therefore, a serious Gulf–Iran track should focus on three practical results: a clear de-escalation protocol with direct crisis hotlines, agreed red lines, and rules for incidents at sea; a shipping framework that avoids legitimizing any one-side “permits” while reducing surprises and keeping commercial transit stable; and a regional security format where Gulf states are not just watching US–Iran bargaining, but shaping a regional arrangement that protects their economies first.
Washington’s problem is not Iran’s strength – it’s Gulf reality
The US approach often assumes that pressure will force Iran to “behave” while allies remain isolated. But the Gulf cannot be isolated from Hormuz. That is the whole point.
If the Strait is the leverage, then Gulf states are the first hostages of escalation—financially, politically, and socially.
So, the most rational policy is the least romantic one: talk to Iran, build a containment mechanism for crises, and reduce the space where outsiders can gamble with Gulf stability.
Because in the end, the Gulf states don’t live in Washington’s theories. They live next to the Strait. Next to Iran.
Tamer Ajrami is a student of political science living in Belgium
