Frederic C. Hof
New Lines Magazine / October 8, 2024
An armistice that followed the Nakba offers one historical precedent for ending the country’s conflict with Israel
Mistakenly attributed to Winston Churchill, the expression “Never let a good crisis go to waste” still ranks as one of the greatest things that he (or, for that matter, baseball great Yogi Berra, to whom the saying is also sometimes attributed) never said. It has special applicability to the crisis — political-military and humanitarian — currently centered on Lebanon and featuring Israel’s attempt to degrade and destroy the military capabilities of what had been the most powerful nonstate entity on the planet: Hezbollah.
It may seem premature to speak of diplomacy amid Israel’s widespread, destructive air campaign across much of Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s continuing operations in southern Lebanon. In this context, the Lebanese government does not appear relevant or even sovereign, seeing as it is unable to protect its territory or people. The fate of Hezbollah itself is unclear, along with its role in the national power equation. Indeed, this is a crisis that may still have a long run of death, terror and misery ahead of it, far too much of it falling on civilians. There appears to be no short-term diplomatic off switch.
Yet all wars end, and two parties in particular — the governments of Lebanon and Israel — should not dismiss the possibility that something more sustainable for both sides could be in the offing once the terrible violence subsides. Indeed, if each decides that the current crisis ought not be wasted — that it ought not merely serve as the precursor to the next round of bloodshed — they may act now in ways that open doors to civilized alternatives.
One way to break the endless cycle of bloodshed would be having an interlocutor on the other side of the Blue Line (as Lebanon’s border with Israel is known) willing to discuss security concerns and able to implement mutually agreed measures. Indeed, as unlikely as it may seem today, a supremely effective mechanism for such a relationship existed from 1949 until June 1967 in the form of the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement, mediated by the United Nations.
Alone of the four armistices ending the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Israel-Lebanon Armistice functioned as intended. The armistice’s Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) — two Israeli officers, two Lebanese officers and one U.N. officer — functioned efficiently and cordially. This continued even during the 1967 war (in which Lebanon did not participate).
As a result of the 1967 war, Israel’s armistice lines with Egypt, Jordan and Syria ended up well to the rear of Israeli front lines. Israel declared those armistices defunct. But what to do about the well-functioning armistice with Lebanon, which had stayed out of the war? For the sake of consistency, Israel renounced that one too. Before long, Lebanon lost control of its districts bordering Israel and the Golan Heights, first to the Palestinian resistance movement and then to Hezbollah.
Despite the implosion of the Lebanese state during the 1975-1990 civil war and again more recently, the government of Lebanon has consistently maintained that its armistice with Israel still exists. Indeed, this position is enshrined in the Taif Agreement which, in 1989, established the basis for ending Lebanon’s civil war.
A cynic, however, would argue that Lebanon has adhered to the armistice in principle not because it wishes to take charge and interact with Israeli officers to secure the Lebanon-Israel frontier and keep the peace, but because the terms of the 1949 armistice limited Lebanon to only 1,500 soldiers south of a line roughly corresponding to the Litani River. A cynic might be right. By claiming to be limited by the armistice, successive Lebanese governments could avoid placing forces of sufficient numbers in southern Lebanon to confront the illegal armed presence of Hezbollah. Indeed, by accepting Hezbollah’s false claim to be the “Lebanese Resistance,” Lebanon’s corruptly incompetent political class gave the arms of Iran’s proxy the veneer of legality; a gesture totally contrary to Lebanon’s commitments under the 1949 armistice.
Now, however, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati has declared his readiness to dispatch 10,000 soldiers to help the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol southern Lebanon once a cease-fire takes hold. Mikati, who spoke publicly in early 2024 about the continued relevance of the 1949 armistice, has now gone silent on it, emphasizing instead the need to help the U.N. enforce Security Council Resolution 1701 — the resolution that ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. With Lebanon no longer needing to hide behind the armistice’s 1,500-troop limit, the armistice itself may have lost its usefulness and relevance within Lebanese political circles.
Indeed, if southern Lebanon can be purged of Hezbollah fighters — and that is a big if — through the combined efforts of UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, it would seem to make no difference whether the authority cited for effectively policing southern Lebanon is Resolution 1701, the 1949 armistice, or both. But the challenge here is one of not allowing a “good crisis” to go wasted. Why would Lebanon settle for a supporting role in securing and stabilizing its own territory, effectively subordinating itself to UNIFIL in implementing that part of Resolution 1701 mandating the removal of militia forces? Why not at least be seen as taking charge by challenging Israel to revive and revise an armistice that never should have been renounced in the first place, an armistice Lebanon continues to recognize as valid? The belief here is that any such display of Lebanese initiative would receive strong support in the U.S., the European Union and elsewhere.
Israel might well reject such an offer. But it should think carefully before allowing an opportunity to be squandered. It needs a reliably effective and permanent interlocutor along the Blue Line. Although UNIFIL has been an “interim” force since 1978, it is no substitute for a capable Lebanese state. That state does not currently exist. But a Lebanese government seen by its own people as trying to act as if it has authority may someday be endowed with authority. Pressing for a renewed and revised armistice could be an important state-building step for Lebanon, one that would subtract nothing from the prospect of implementing Resolution 1701. Indeed, given the enshrinement of the armistice in Taif, Hezbollah could (unlike its stand on Resolution 1701) reject it only by making official its alienation from Lebanon itself.
Despite the current bloodshed and chaos, each side should see merit in a revived and revised armistice. Each side should endeavour to make sure the current crisis does not go to waste. But surely the crisis itself — especially its horrific effects on civilians — must soon begin to wind down. Otherwise, there will be no support for any government seeking civilized alternatives to unspeakable civilian suffering.
Ambassador Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement; he is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt To Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022)
