International Crisis Group (ICG) / October 3, 2024
Emboldened by recent operational successes, Israel is contemplating how to answer Iran’s 1 October ballistic missile barrage. The Biden administration should do all it can to urge a calibrated response that allows tensions to ease.
A year after Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack in southern Israel, the Middle East is on the cusp of all-out war. Since Israel launched its military response in Gaza, the Biden administration has tried both to broker a ceasefire there and to manage the risk of regional escalation. But the lack of a Gaza deal has fuelled hostilities elsewhere, and today the regional containment effort is at grave risk. Emboldened by operational wins over Tehran and the groups in the Iran-backed “axis of resistance”, Israel sent troops into Lebanon, and it is now contemplating how to answer the Iranian ballistic missile attack on 1 October. As with a similar attack in April, Israeli air defences, bolstered by the U.S. and others, blunted the impact of the barrage. But unlike in April, when the U.S. pressed Israel to keep its response restrained and then to de-escalate, this time around White House officials have voiced support for a “severe” though “proportionate” retaliation. President Joe Biden says the reprisal should exclude striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, but other major blows to Iran could also prompt an escalatory spiral. The U.S. should use its full leverage to urge a calibrated response that allows tensions to ease.
U.S. fears of full-blown Middle East war date to the early stages of Israel’s response to the Hamas attack. The Biden administration expressed its disapproval of war plans pushed by Israeli leaders, including Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, who sought to emphasise Israel’s conflict with Hizbollah, Iran’s most potent regional partner. Although Israel focused on attacking Hamas, other “axis of resistance” militants opened new fronts to divert Israeli military assets from Gaza. The most significant of these was at Israel’s northern border, where Hizbollah initiated a year-long firefight that saw tens of thousands displaced on both sides. Ansar Allah in Yemen (commonly known as the Houthis) also joined the fray, as did Iraqi armed groups, which cited U.S. support for Israel to justify attacking U.S. forces in Iraq, Jordan and Syria. All the “axis” groups made clear that their campaign would continue absent a Gaza ceasefire. The U.S., for its part, sent aircraft carrier groups to the Mediterranean Sea to deter Iran and allied militias, while behind the scenes it sought ways to temper hostilities.
Israel’s recent operational successes have somewhat changed Washington’s thinking. U.S. officials see Israel acting with increasing freedom of manoeuvre after largely fending off Iran’s substantial drone and missile attack in April. Tehran’s failure to land a blow then appears to have opened the door for the Netanyahu government to venture bolder attacks – killing Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on the day of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration, using booby-trapped communications equipment to decimate Hizbollah’s command structure, killing the group’s long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah and, most recently, staging ground incursions into Lebanon. The human toll of this last measure has been grave for a society already reeling from years of political and economic crisis: more than a thousand Lebanese have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. Hizbollah, while seriously diminished, may yet find a way to fight back.
Israel’s recent achievements have undercut voices in the Biden administration that have warned of the risk of escalation.
Israel’s recent achievements have undercut voices in the Biden administration that have warned of the risk of escalation. U.S. officials evince surprise at the scope and sophistication of some of Israel’s operations and the lack of meaningful response by Iran and its allies. Despite Israel’s strikes on Hizbollah, Iran’s linchpin ally, the administration began to coalesce around the view that all-out war was increasingly unlikely, with some officials wondering whether Iran would respond forcefully to its setbacks at all. Against this backdrop, some U.S. officials have appeared to be increasingly attracted by Israel’s military logic, with one senior official saying Israel’s Lebanon campaign might be a generational opportunity to remake the region. The ballistic missile barrage Iran fired at Israel on 1 October, while puncturing the sense that Iran would stand by, has if anything fuelled hawkish sentiment in Washington.
For its part, Tehran faced a choice between doing nothing and seeing its deterrence shredded or responding and risking a bigger Israeli attack at a time when Hizbollah is gravely weakened. Facing enormous pressure at home and from restive partners throughout the region, Iran seems to have felt compelled to respond. In the end, its missile barrage was heavier than in April. Tehran also gave Israel’s allies less time to prepare than it had in April, sending signals of what was coming only a few hours, not days, in advance. Still, if Iran intended the strikes to re-establish a modicum of deterrence, they failed to do so. Not only do Israel and the U.S., together with other partners, appear to have shot down most of the missiles, limiting damage and keeping fatalities to one (a Palestinian in the West Bank town of Jericho), but the Iranian strikes have invited international condemnation and opened the door to an even stronger Israeli response.
There seems to be little doubt that Israel will launch another attack on Iran, but the question is whether the intent will be to display its capabilities
There seems to be little doubt that Israel will launch another attack on Iran, but the question is whether the intent will be to display its capabilities – as it did in April when it targeted Iranian air defence systems in Isfahan, in proximity to an Iranian nuclear facility – or to pursue grander strategic objectives, possibly with Washington’s blessing and even assistance. Prominent voices in Israel and their supporters in the U.S. view the moment as ripe for the latter, encouraging Israel to go for the jugular by taking out Iran’s nuclear program or even toppling its regime. These people are urging Washington to remove the fetters they believe have prevented Israel from pressing its advantage over the past year.
While Biden’s remarks about proportionality and the unacceptability of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities suggests that the White House is not willing to go that far, there remains cause for concern. One worry is that a U.S. administration impressed by Israeli tactical proficiency, hemmed in by domestic politics and nervous about the presidential election approaching in early November will greenlight a massive Israeli response. Washington may tell itself that Iran has already telegraphed the limits of its capabilities in April and on 1 October, and that with Hizbollah tied up and U.S. forces mobilised across the region, escalation risks can be managed. Another fear is that Israel embarks on a major strike even without explicit U.S. consent. With or without U.S. support, options include operations intended to destroy critical infrastructure and destabilise the Iranian regime, a subject Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alluded to in a direct message to the Iranian people on 30 September.
Escalation would be a mistake, however, and those who call for more miss the point about Iran’s 1 October attack: Tehran neither wants a war nor is blind to the peril it faces. It had to understand the risk it was taking when it fired on Israel. Yet, however severe the anticipated consequences, Tehran’s continued inaction appears to have undercut its credibility with its base of domestic support and regional partners. Whatever a threatened, cornered Iran might do in response to a major attack cannot match the military might of the U.S. and Israel, but it would almost certainly cause considerable destruction and prompt further escalation. Iran and its regional partners would likely retaliate against Israel, potentially with heavier barrages of ballistic missiles aimed not at military facilities but at cities. They could also strike U.S. assets throughout the Middle East, including U.S. military personnel stationed there. They might even target regional oil and gas infrastructure. Nor is an Israeli strike on Iran likely to set back its nuclear program more than temporarily, though it would be certain to harden Tehran’s resolve to acquire the ultimate deterrent.
Having played its cards with success several times in the past few months, Israel may be susceptible to overreach, but Washington should not take the bait.
Having played its cards with success several times in the past few months, Israel may be susceptible to overreach, but Washington should not take the bait. The U.S. should make clear that it will not take part in or support an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities or infrastructure. It should also use the full extent of its influence to keep Israel from going alone in this direction. Israel may see this decision as its own to make, but the implications would likely draw in the U.S. and inevitably radiate out to the region and beyond. Taking such decisions at a moment of military ascendancy risks overlooking the dangers that remain and could still tip the Middle East into all-out war or longer-term wars of attrition. Whatever the U.S. says publicly, senior officials should privately communicate to Israel that its response must be calibrated. Iran, in turn, would then refrain from retaliating, leaving Israel to take the win. It would then be for Washington to press Israel toward de-escalation in Gaza and Lebanon. The surest path to that end remains a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza – which is not only a humanitarian imperative but also the best way to get to an agreement on the Israel-Lebanon border. Short of that, the U.S. should look to curb the intensity and ambition of Israel’s Lebanon campaign, which could easily expand and bog down Israel in ways disastrous for both it and Lebanon.
